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THE  DISCRIMINATION  PRESUMPTION
Joseph A. Seiner*
Employment discrimination is a fact in our society.  Scientific studies continue to show that
employer misconduct in the workplace is pervasive.  This social science research is further sup-
ported by governmental data and litigation statistics.  Even in the face of this evidence, however,
it has never been more difficult to successfully bring a claim of employment discrimination.  After
the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, all civil litigants must sufficiently plead enough facts to give rise to a plausible claim.
Empirical studies show that this plausibility test has been rigidly applied in the employment
context, creating a heightened pleading standard for workplace plaintiffs.
This Article argues that Twombly and Iqbal are largely irrelevant for employment discrim-
ination claims.  As employment discrimination is a fact, most allegations of workplace miscon-
duct are plausible on their face, rendering these Supreme Court cases meaningless for this subset
of claims.  This Article summarizes the overwhelming number of social science studies that
demonstrate the fact of employment discrimination, and this Article also synthesizes the govern-
mental data and litigation in this field.
This Article offers a model framework that the courts and litigants can use to evaluate
workplace claims, taking into consideration the widespread scientific research in this area.  This
proposed model navigates the Supreme Court decisions and federal rules and provides a new
approach to pleading employment claims, where the fact of discrimination is presumed.  This
Article concludes by situating the proposed framework in the context of the broader academic
scholarship.
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and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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Unless the employer is a latter-day George Washington, employment discrimination is
as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree.
—Judge Irving L. Goldberg, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit1
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INTRODUCTION
Recent news events have seen many overt acts of high-profile discrimina-
tion.  Racial tensions and violence ensued when a Confederate monument
was removed in Charlottesville, Virginia.2  Jewish community centers and
cemeteries have recently encountered bomb threats and vandalism resulting
in FBI investigations.3  And in Kansas City, a man shouted a number of racial
slurs before shooting two Indian men, killing one of them.4  Even celebrities
have recently faced overt racism, as vandals spray-painted an ugly racial
1 Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985),
quoted in Charles A. Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof:
An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 16 (1986).
2 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, Man Charged After White Nationalist
Rally in Charlottesville Ends in Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/08/12/us/charlottesville-protest-white-nationalist.html.
3 Eric Levenson & AnneClaire Stapleton, Jewish Center Bomb Threats Top 100; Kids Pul-
led from Schools, CNN (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/28/us/bomb-
threats-jewish-centers-jcc/index.html.
4 See Mark Berman, Kansas Man Indicted on Hate Crime Charges in Shooting of Two Indian
Men, WASH. POST (June 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2017/06/09/kansas-man-indicted-on-hate-crime-charges-in-shootings-of-two-indian-
men/.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 3  7-FEB-19 10:00
2019] the  discrimination  presumption 1117
epithet at the home of LeBron James,5 one of the best known athletes in the
world.
While such blatant discrimination continues to pervade our society,
many believe that employment discrimination is simply a vestige of the past.6
Playing off of this belief, many federal courts have made it more difficult to
bring discrimination claims, particularly those arising in the workplace.7
Over a decade ago, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8 the Supreme Court dra-
matically changed the pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, making it far more difficult for victims of employment discrimina-
tion to bring workplace claims.  Prior to the Twombly decision, the Court had
expressly endorsed a notice pleading system where a civil complaint would be
allowed to proceed if there were any “set of facts” that would support the
allegations.9  In Twombly, the Court abrogated this earlier standard and put
in its place a heightened pleading requirement that plaintiffs must allege
sufficient facts to support a “plausible” claim.10  Two years later, in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,11 the Court would further clarify that this plausibility requirement
applies to all civil claims brought under the federal rules.  The plausibility
standard has been widely critiqued in the academic literature.12  The stan-
dard has largely replaced the notice pleading system endorsed years ago
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  By requiring that numerous
facts be alleged, the plausibility requirement has been criticized in scholar-
ship as substantially heightening the pleading requirements for federal
complaints.13
There are many cases where Twombly and Iqbal have had minimal, if any,
impact.  For example, in a run-of-the-mill negligence claim the basic facts are
quickly ascertainable and easily alleged in the complaint.  If an individual
were negligently injured in a hit-and-run accident, the core facts of the claim
5 See Andrew Blankstein & Daniella Silva, LeBron James’ Los Angeles Home Vandalized
with ‘N-Word’ Graffiti, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
lebron-james-los-angeles-home-vandalized-n-word-graffiti-n766651.
6 See generally Laurence Kranich, A Simple Theoretical Argument for Affirmative
Action (Sept. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://f-origin.hypotheses.org/wp-con
tent/blogs.dir/1704/files/2013/12/a-simple-theoretical-argument-for-affirmative-action
.pdf.
7 See infra Part II (discussing empirical studies on plausibility standard).
8 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
9 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547 (“Here, the Court is not requiring heightened fact plead-
ing of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”).
11 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
12 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ash-
croft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2
(2010).
13 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 (2010); David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117,
119 n.12 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-FEB-19 10:00
1118 notre dame law review [vol. 94:3
could be quickly uncovered by a relatively straightforward investigation and
inquiry into the case.14  The same cannot be said, however, for workplace
discrimination cases.  Where an individual is improperly fired, demoted, or
disciplined on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),15 the core
facts of the claim will often be in the possession of the employer.16  Memo-
randa, emails, personnel files, and other documents that would support the
claim are frequently maintained by the company that employs the worker.
Without this documentation, it is often difficult—if not impossible—to
uncover the critical facts in the case that would support an allegation of dis-
crimination.  Indeed, as these claims require a showing of discriminatory
intent, alleging this type of unlawful motivation can be a daunting task, par-
ticularly when discovery has not even begun in the case.17
Many courts have applied an unnecessarily rigid interpretation of the
plausibility requirement in workplace cases,18 making it far more difficult for
victims of discrimination to even proceed past the initial stages of the
claim.19  The plausibility standard has unleashed a powerful weapon for
14 MICHAEL C. SUBIT, TELL ME A GOOD STORY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COM-
PLAINTS AFTER Twombly & Iqbal, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adminis
trative/labor_law/meetings/2010/annualconference/054.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Oct. 10, 2018) (“The allegation of ‘negligence’ consists entirely of ‘on date, at place, the
defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.’  An allegation that ‘the
defendant negligently drove a vehicle’ is a legal conclusion.  A [sic] allegation that ‘the
defendant terminated plaintiff because of his national origin’ is not.  But in a post-Iqbal
world, a plaintiff who alleges only the ultimate fact of discrimination runs the risk of having
a court label it as a ‘conclusion of law.’”).
15 Title VII—which covers workplaces with fifteen or more employees—makes it
unlawful for employers to take an adverse action against workers with respect to race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
16 See J. Scott Pritchard, Comment, The Hidden Costs of Pleading Plausibility: Examining
the Impact of Twombly and Iqbal on Employment Discrimination Complaints and the EEOC’s
Litigation and Mediation Efforts, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 757, 775–76 (2011) (“Often a plaintiff at
the initial pleading stage will not have the evidence necessary to plausibly suggest discrimi-
nation has taken place without relying on what a court may now freely designate a ‘legal
conclusion.’  Because discrimination claims require proof of a subjective state of mind, an
assertion of a culpable state of mind, without access to supporting evidence, cannot be
anything other than a legal conclusion.”); Lisa L. Heller & Abena P. Sanders, Post Iqbal
Pleading Standards in Discrimination Cases, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2009), https://www.law360
.com/articles/123417/post-iqbal-pleading-standards-in-discrimination-cases (“In the
employment discrimination context, the ‘Twombly/Iqbal’ standard has proven difficult for
plaintiffs, who rely heavily on the discovery process, to meet.”).
17 Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1613, 1635 (2011) (“Others point out that, especially for civil rights claims, which
typically require intent, the critical information to ascertaining the defendant’s state of
mind is necessarily unavailable without discovery.”).
18 See infra Part II (discussing application of plausibility standard to employment dis-
crimination claims).
19 See infra Part II (discussing application of plausibility standard to employment dis-
crimination claims).
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defendants, and many viable workplace claims are now failing to even find
their way out of the starting gates.
This Article argues that, when properly interpreted, the plausibility stan-
dard should be irrelevant for most employment discrimination cases.  The
standard, which arose well outside the workplace context, was never meant to
have been so negatively applied to employment discrimination claims.
Indeed, on their face most claims of race, color, sex, national origin, and
religious discrimination are at least “plausible.”  As this Article will show, the
overwhelming weight of social science literature and other research studies
reveal a widespread prevalence of discrimination in our society.20  This dis-
crimination occurs against all protected classes both in and outside of the
workplace.  While many of the existing studies suggest that the discriminatory
intent is implicit rather than overt, the discrimination is nonetheless quite
real.21  An allegation of workplace discrimination, then, coupled with this
social science research, should inherently create a plausible claim.
Beyond the social science research and other evidence of discriminatory
attitudes in our society, it is difficult to ignore the more anecdotal—yet
alarming—evidence of discrimination.  Numerous instances of systemic dis-
crimination against all protected classes continue to make headlines.  There
are countless examples of stunningly large judgments against major corpora-
tions in workplace discrimination cases.22  And there are an equally substan-
tial number of large settlements of Title VII claims.23  Indeed, the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the governmental agency
that enforces Title VII in private sector cases, finds cause to believe that dis-
crimination occurs in the workplace thousands of times each year.24
Given this widespread successful litigation and considering the scientific
research and governmental data in this area, there can be little doubt that
any specific claim of discrimination is in itself at least plausible.25 Iqbal and
Twombly are thus largely irrelevant to Title VII litigation as a practical matter.
Prior to these decisions, the vast majority of claims proceeded past the dismis-
20 See infra Part III (discussing social science research on discrimination); see also Ste-
phanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (2017) (“In the fifty
years since Title VII . . . first prohibited employment discrimination . . . societal under-
standing of how bias perpetuates inequality at work has advanced exponentially.  Decades
of research . . . in the fields of economics, sociology, social psychology, neuroscience, and
more have created a deep body of scientific work on which our current understanding is
based.”).
21 See infra Part III (discussing discrimination studies).
22 See infra Part III (discussing large settlements and judgments in recent discrimina-
tion cases).
23 See infra Part III.
24 Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2017).
25 Merriam-Webster defines “plausible” to mean “superficially fair, reasonable, or valua-
ble but often specious.” Plausible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/plausible (last visited Aug. 18, 2017).
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sal stage of the litigation and were allowed to advance to discovery.26  This
same result should still occur even when the plausibility standard is fairly
considered.
A little more is needed today than was ten years ago, however, by plain-
tiffs bringing these claims.  Indeed, a victim of employment discrimination
should now attach the relevant evidence establishing the existence of dis-
criminatory attitudes and motivations in our society as part of the plead-
ings.27  Social science research, the results of similar litigation, and current
EEOC data should all be attached to the complaint to further bolster allega-
tions of discriminatory conduct.  Such additional documentation will provide
plausibility to most claims of workplace misconduct.  This information helps
support the fact of the pervasive nature of employment discrimination.  With
the proper support, plaintiffs should be permitted to plead this fact in the
complaint, and discrimination should be presumed in most cases.
Similarly, defendants should be given the opportunity to rebut this evi-
dence and demonstrate why the facts present the more unusual case where
dismissal is appropriate.  It may be that there is a continuing pattern of frivo-
lous litigation brought by the plaintiff in the case that would make discovery
inappropriate in the matter.  Or it may be that there is no proper jurisdiction
in the case, or that the administrative requirements have not adequately been
satisfied.  There are thus numerous legal arguments that can be made to sup-
port the dismissal of a Title VII case.  An argument that an employer’s dis-
criminatory motivations are implausible, however, should be difficult to
establish given the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the field.
This Article takes no position on the likelihood that a particular claim will
ultimately succeed in the courts on its merits.  Rather, it argues that too many
claims are now being thrown out too early, before the claimant has a fair
opportunity to uncover critical information, which is often in the possession
of the employer.  A typical employment discrimination case should not be
rejected simply because the plaintiff has not been given access to relevant
documentation.  At the end of the day, then, this Article argues that given
the undeniable evidence of continued workplace discrimination in our coun-
try, the plausibility standard does little to change the viability of a Title VII
case at its onset.  When examined in this light, we are left with the simple
conclusion that most Title VII cases should be permitted to proceed past
dismissal, just as they were before Twombly and Iqbal.  These Supreme Court
cases on plausibility are largely irrelevant when applied to allegations of
26 E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (holding that a height-
ened pleading standard for workplace discrimination cases violated Rule 8(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (vacating and remanding the district court’s dismissal of workplace discrimination
claims); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (reversing
dismissal “[b]ecause a plaintiff need not set forth the elements of a prima facie case at the
initial pleading stage”); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating and
remanding the district court’s dismissal of discrimination case).
27 See infra Part V (discussing addenda to pleadings).
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employment discrimination.  Workplace discrimination is a fact, and most
Title VII suits are plausible on their face.
This Article proceeds in several parts.  In Part I, this Article examines the
Twombly and Iqbal cases, giving particular consideration to their impact on
employment discrimination claims.  In Part II, this Article examines how the
federal courts have rigidly applied the plausibility standard articulated in
these cases to Title VII claims.  In Part III, this Article draws together substan-
tial evidence of ongoing employment discrimination in our society and in the
workplace.  The Article closely examines the existing studies of discrimina-
tion in each of the protected categories—including race, sex, national origin,
and religion.  This Part also explores the numerous claims of employment
discrimination brought to the EEOC and examines the number of cause
findings by this Agency each year based on different protected characteris-
tics.  This Article then looks beyond the studies to actual litigation in each of
these areas, providing further evidence of the numerous instances of discrim-
ination in the workplace.
Part IV examines how this social science research and other evidence of
discrimination can be introduced at the early stages of the litigation.  This
Part specifically explores how such information may properly be included in
a federal civil complaint.  Part V identifies a new framework for pleading
employment discrimination claims, explaining why any given allegation of
workplace discrimination is inherently plausible under the standard articu-
lated by the Supreme Court.  This Part navigates the federal rules and
Supreme Court caselaw, explaining how the overwhelming evidence of socie-
tal discrimination can (and should) be attached to Title VII pleadings.  This
Part further explains the limited exceptions to my proposed framework.  Part
VI of this Article situates the proposed framework within the context of the
existing scholarship and explains the irrelevancy of both Twombly and Iqbal
when applied to most Title VII cases.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PLAUSIBILITY REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the pleading requirements in
civil cases is well-traveled ground in the academic literature.28  This Article
thus only briefly summarizes the history of the procedural rules and the
development of the plausibility standard.29  The pleading requirements of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had remained largely settled for
28 See, e.g., Jill Curry & Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs
File? A Study Comparing Removal Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 827 (2013); Miller, supra
note 12 (discussing impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the civil litigation model established by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1293 (2010) (addressing Twombly and Iqbal and pre-Twombly authority); Suja A.
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (arguing the motion to dismiss is being treated like
the new summary judgment motion).
29 For a more developed discussion of these cases, see Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 183–91 (2010).
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decades.  Rule 8(a) clearly establishes the basic pleading standard in civil
cases, requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim” that is suffi-
cient to give the defendant notice of the allegations.30  This type of “notice
pleading” sets up a minimal pleading requirement under the rules.  The stan-
dard was more clearly defined years ago in the seminal case of Conley v.
Gibson.31
In Conley, the Supreme Court examined whether dismissal of a com-
plaint was proper under Rule 8(a),32 where African American workers main-
tained that their union “did nothing to protect them against . . .
discriminatory discharges and refused to give them protection comparable to
that given white employees.”33  The plaintiffs further alleged that “the
[u]nion had failed in general to represent [black] employees equally and in
good faith.”34  The Supreme Court concluded that these allegations were suf-
ficient, noting that a complaint should not be dismissed unless “it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”35  The Court explained that “all the Rules
require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defen-
dant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”36  The Court further noted that “[s]uch simplified ‘notice pleading’ is
made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial
procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of
both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and
issues.”37
The Court examined this notice pleading standard in a workplace dis-
crimination case in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.38 In Swierkiewicz, the Court
examined the allegations of a 53-year-old native of Hungary who “had been
terminated [by his employer] on account of his national origin in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . and on account of his age in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).”39
The plaintiff’s “complaint detailed the events leading to his termination, pro-
vided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least some
of the relevant persons involved with his termination.”40  The Court found
the allegations sufficient, emphasizing the simplified pleading standard that
“[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allega-
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
31 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
32 Id. at 47.
33 Id. at 43.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 47–48.
38 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
39 Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 514.
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tions.”41  The Supreme Court concluded that “under a notice pleading sys-
tem, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a
prima facie case . . . in every employment discrimination case.”42  The Court
thus reversed dismissal, concluding that the complaint gave the defendant
“fair notice of what [the plaintiff’s] claims are and the grounds upon which
they rest.”43
In more recent years, the Court has revisited its analysis from Conley.  In
Twombly, the Court considered a civil antitrust case brought under section
one of the Sherman Act.44  The case involved allegations that local telephone
companies were conspiring together to negatively impact consumer prices.45
In the case, the Court examined the “antecedent question of what a plaintiff
must plead in order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.”46  The
Court abrogated the “no set of facts” language from Conley, concluding that
this “puzzling” standard must be “forgotten.”47
The Court replaced the Conley standard with a plausibility analysis.48
Under the plausibility requirement, a complaint must set forth “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”49  The Court noted that
the complaint should “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
include more than “labels and conclusions.”50  The Court held that the plain-
tiffs had not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausi-
ble.”51  There was substantial debate after Twombly as to whether this
“plausibility” standard applied only to antitrust cases,52 or whether it should
be considered more broadly in all civil litigation.  The Supreme Court would
resolve this debate in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.53
In Iqbal, the Court considered a Bivens action alleging that government
officials had violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.54  The complaint
41 Id. (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
42 Id. at 511.
43 Id. at 514.
44 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548 (2007).
45 Id. at 550–51.
46 Id. at 554–55.
47 Id. at 562–63.
48 Id. at 557.
49 Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 555.  The Court stated that “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Id.
51 Id. at 570.  Applying this plausibility standard to the matter before it, the Court held
that “stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest that an agreement was made.” Id. at 556.
52 See Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 101 n.54, 121–22 (2010)
[hereinafter Seiner, Pleading Disability]; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Pro-
posed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 [here-
inafter Seiner, Trouble with Twombly] (discussing scholarship on issue).
53 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
54 Id. The complaint alleged that
petitioners designated Iqbal a person “of high interest” on account of his race,
religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments;
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included allegations that these officials used race, religion, and/or national
origin to create an unlawful policy resulting in unlawful prison conditions.55
The Court concluded that the plausibility test should apply to “antitrust and
discrimination suits alike,”56 noting that the requirement should be applied
to “all civil actions.”57
The Iqbal Court also helped further define plausibility, noting that a
complaint should include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlaw-
fully-harmed-me accusation.”58  Thus, “naked assertions” without “further
factual enhancement” are insufficient.59  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s
allegations in the case, concluding that the alleged claims were not moved
“from conceivable to plausible.”60  The Court held that the complaint was
too “conclusory” and “extravagantly fanciful.”61
II. APPLYING PLAUSIBILITY TO TITLE VII—THE PROBLEM OF INTENT
Though the Twombly and Iqbal cases arose outside of the employment
context,62 the plausibility standard has been widely applied to discrimination
cases brought under Title VII.63  Many of the courts applying the standard
have required far more from plaintiffs than those courts analyzing the issue
prior to Twombly.64  There can be little doubt that after Iqbal, some courts
have often applied a heightened pleading requirement to employment dis-
crimination cases.
Proving workplace discrimination involves examining a defendant’s
mental state, which is notoriously difficult to establish.65  Pleading discrimi-
that the FBI, under Mueller’s direction, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men as part of its September 11 investigation; that petitioners knew of,
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Iqbal to harsh condi-
tions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of the prohibited
factors and for no legitimate penological interest; and that Ashcroft was the pol-
icy’s “principal architect” and Mueller was “instrumental” in its adoption and
execution.
Id. at 662.
55 Id. at 666.
56 Id. at 684.
57 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
58 Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
59 Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
60 Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
61 Id. at 681.  The Court further noted that a plaintiff must assert more in a complaint
than the “bare elements” of the claim. Id. at 687.
62 There are many recent decisions addressing plaintiffs’ claims under this plausibility
standard. See, e.g., Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015); Alja-Iz v.
U.S. V.I. Dep’t of Educ., 626 F. App’x 44, 46–47 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Littlejohn v.
City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015).
63 See, e.g., Seiner, Pleading Disability, supra note 52; Seiner, Trouble with Twombly, supra
note 52.
64 See Seiner, Trouble with Twombly, supra note 52, at 1031.
65 See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY
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natory intent has always been difficult,66 and the plausibility standard seems
to fall particularly harshly on workers claiming employment discrimination.67
This is likely because plaintiffs in both tort and other civil cases have much
better access to the evidence necessary to support their claims than plaintiffs
in workplace discrimination cases.  Additionally, plaintiffs in employment dis-
crimination cases are required (in most instances) to show intent—that their
employer discriminated because of a protected characteristic.68  The intent
requirement is particularly difficult to meet in the context of the Supreme
Court’s plausibility test.69  The plaintiff’s membership in a protected class,70
employment qualifications, and adverse action suffered (all elements of the
prima facie case) are often quite straightforward to establish.71  It is the
employer’s mental status that is frequently the most difficult issue to prove in
a Title VII case.72
Information that would help establish an employer’s discriminatory
intent is often difficult for workplace victims to access, which often results in
employment discrimination claims being “particularly vulnerable to prema-
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 188 n.17 (1997) (“Complex issues involving state of mind are of
course not limited to discrimination cases, but appear in myriad contexts.”).
66 See, e.g., Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment Dis-
crimination if She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances: The Need for Broad Workforce and
Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 159 (1996).
67 See Seiner, supra note 29, at 187.
68 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
69 See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary
Judgment” Days of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment
Affirmed Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
685, 688 (2012–2013) (stating that employment discrimination cases “almost always turn
on delicate factual nuances of intent”); Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of Discrimination:
Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 797, 842 (2011) (“The critical factual question in most disparate treatment
cases is not whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, but rather whether
the employer acted with a discriminatory intent.”).  This Article does not address disparate
impact claims, which do not require a showing of intent.
70 See, e.g., Opoku v. Brega, No. 15-cv-2213, 2016 WL 5720807, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2016) (“Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has alleged that he is a member of a
protected class.”); Alston v. Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 293, 301 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Neither
party here disputes that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.”).
71 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The
parties do not dispute that [plaintiff’s] allegations would be sufficient to establish the first
three prongs of a prima facie case . . . as the complaint alleges that [plaintiff] . . . suffered
an adverse employment action through her demotion.”); Lewis v. Roosevelt Island Operat-
ing Corp., 246 F. Supp. 3d 979, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The parties do not dispute that
Plaintiff . . . suffered an adverse employment action (his termination).”).
72 Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspec-
tive, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 679 (2012–2013) (identifying the ultimate issue in discrimi-
nation cases as “whether the plaintiff presented evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find that, more likely than not, the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part
by discrimination”).
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ture dismissal.”73  In particular, the employer often controls pertinent docu-
ments in the case, and the plaintiff may no longer be in a position to access
critical evidence.74  Indeed, a plaintiff may have been demoted, transferred,
or fired from their original position, leaving them without access to their
personal data.  Moreover, even if a plaintiff is able to access information in
the employer’s control, employers are “‘rarely so cooperative as to include a
notation in the personnel file’ that the firing is for a reason expressly forbid-
den by law.”75  For these reasons, discriminatory intent is often established
through circumstantial—rather than direct—evidence of bias or animus.76
And establishing discrimination through circumstantial evidence is inher-
ently a fact-specific and case-specific endeavor.  Without “smoking gun” type
evidence, the question of whether a plaintiff has provided sufficient proof of
an employer’s animus is largely a subjective inquiry.
There are countless ways for victims of employment discrimination to
allege circumstantial evidence of a Title VII violation.  Statistical data, dis-
criminatory comments, and evidence related to similarly situated coworkers
are all common forms of proof.77  Following the language of Iqbal, the courts
may also turn to their “judicial experience and common sense”78 when exam-
ining the intent question—particularly for those cases involving primarily cir-
cumstantial evidence.  Thus, for many workplace claims, the application of
the plausibility test could turn on a judge’s beliefs about the existence of
73 Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 652 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Keith N.
Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
187, 200 (1993) (identifying workplace discrimination claims as a litigation area “in which
the defendant is likely to possess an informational advantage”); Suja A. Thomas, Essay,
Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 222
(noting that “information asymmetries, which favor the defendant, are in place, and a
requirement of only notice pleading would permit the plaintiff to proceed fairly onto
discovery”).
74 Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857, 881 (2010) (noting that
“most of the relevant evidence tends to be under the control of the defendant” and that
“[t]his lack of access to evidence makes proving any type of causation difficult”).
75 Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464–65 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
Pick v. City of Remsen, No. C13-4041, 2014 WL 4258738, at *12 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 27, 2014)
(“Today’s employers, even those with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither admit
discriminatory or retaliatory intent, nor leave a well-developed trail demonstrating it.”).
76 See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015) (“At
the pleadings stage, then, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action
against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts
that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise
to a plausible inference of discrimination.”); see also NLRB v. W. Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d
783, 786 (5th Cir. 1957) (“[P]roof that a discriminatory purpose was the motivating one is
rarely direct, and it may therefore be established from all the circumstances . . . .”);
Edwards, supra note 1, at 7 (quoting W. Point Mfg., 245 F.2d at 786).
77 See generally Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework: Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 983 (1999) (discussing prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).
78 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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discrimination in our society.79  Psychological research has suggested that,
where judges lack “sufficient individuating information” about a claim (as is
often true early in a case), they must rely heavily on their own knowledge,
perceptions, and experiences.80  This “invitation for the exercise of judicial
subjectivity” presents obvious problems for workplace plaintiffs, however, if a
judge’s views on the prevalence of discrimination in American culture con-
flicts with the vast majority of existing research.81
At the pleading stage, a judge’s existing views could clearly influence
whether an employer’s alleged biased comment or other overt act of bias
suggest discriminatory intent or is simply “too attenuated” to create such an
inference.  And other, stronger evidence of discrimination (such as state-
ments made in corporate emails) is often likely to be inaccessible at the
pleading stage.  Thus, the plausibility test often falls particularly harshly on
workplace plaintiffs, given the intent requirement of disparate treatment
employment discrimination cases, and many recent workplace plaintiffs have
found their cases rejected by the federal courts under this standard.82  Given
the ambiguous and subjective nature of the term “plausibility,” then, whether
a workplace discrimination claim will be allowed to proceed will often
depend on the judge’s own experience with and perception of employment
discrimination.  Reasonable minds could certainly differ with respect to many
79 See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1160
(2012); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the Substan-
tive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 773 (2012–2013).
80 Kang et al., supra note 79, at 1160.
81 Schneider & Gertner, supra note 79, at 773.
82 See, e.g., Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that
“seven incidents of harassment by two different men over a nearly three-year period” are
insufficient to establish a plausible harassment claim as allegations spanned over almost a
three-year time frame by two different men, the alleged incidents did not involve any
“actual touching,” and some of the incidents were not “definitively sexual in nature”);
Cauler v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 654 F. App’x 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding former
worker’s allegation that a “substantially younger” person was hired for a job where the
employee also applied was insufficient to give rise to an inference of age discrimination
against that employee, as use of the term “substantially younger” was “a bare contention”
and “a legal conclusion”); House v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 630 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th
Cir. 2015) (finding that an allegation that a worker was fired on the basis of his age, that
employer transferred his job duties to substantially younger employees, and treated worker
much less favorably than those employees, failed “to provide ‘sufficient factual matter’ . . .
to establish an inference of age discrimination”); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp.,
780 F.3d 582, 588 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint leaves open to speculation the
cause for the defendant’s decision to select someone other than her, and the cause that
she asks us to infer (i.e., invidious discrimination) is not plausible in light of the ‘obvious
alternative explanation’ that the decisionmakers simply judged those hired to be more
qualified and better suited for the positions.”); Mapp v. District of Columbia, 993 F. Supp.
2d 22, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding allegations that sex was a motivating factor in the
decision to dismiss worker were insufficient to state a claim, even where plaintiff had
asserted that “she was subjected to heightened scrutiny, reporting, and performance stan-
dards that were not applied to those male comparators”).
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claims, and a more broad-based understanding of the current prevalence of
discrimination in our society will better help many judges to evaluate Title
VII cases.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DISCRIMINATION
Discrimination remains pervasive in our society, both in and out of the
workplace.  There can be little doubt that overt discrimination has decreased
overall since the time Title VII was passed.83  And the days of expressly treating
workers in a discriminatory manner are largely (but not completely) gone.84
Indeed, most employers large enough to be covered by federal antidis-
crimination law—which usually requires at least fifteen employees—are
sophisticated enough to understand that they cannot act in an overtly dis-
criminatory manner.85  When discrimination occurs, it is often subtler or
even unconscious.  It is thus far more difficult to detect this type of conduct
and obtain evidence of discrimination in employment cases than when Title
VII was first passed.86
Many may now—incorrectly—perceive that discrimination is no longer a
pervasive problem in our society.  Or they may improperly believe that if it
does exist, it no longer presents a serious threat to the working environment.
This is simply not the case.  Indeed, the overwhelming weight of scientific
research supports the fact that discrimination in the workplace exists and is
pervasive.  It regularly occurs on the basis of all protected categories, includ-
ing race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.  The discriminatory treat-
ment of workers thus routinely occurs in our current society.  This statement
is provable and thus cannot reasonably be contested.  Repeated, scientific
studies over the course of many years clearly establish the existence of the
fact of discrimination.  And these studies reveal that it occurs on the basis of
every category protected by Title VII.
The problem is that this evidence, and the substantial academic scholar-
ship supporting it, often arises in the literature by nonlegal academics.
83 See Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimina-
tion in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 181, 200 (2008)
(noting that “great progress has been made since the early 1960s” with respect to discrimi-
nation); see also Eden B. King et al., Discrimination in the 21st Century: Are Science and the Law
Aligned?, 17 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 54, 70 (2011) (“[T]his research offers quantitative
support for scholarly reviews of contemporary discrimination . . . that emphasize the preva-
lence of subtler forms of discrimination than the overt forms of the past.” (citation omit-
ted)); Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for
Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 939 (noting that “it would be difficult to
contend that the prevalence of discrimination has not receded”).
84 See generally JOSEPH A. SEINER, THE SUPREME COURT’S NEW WORKPLACE 21 (2017)
(“[W]hen compared to the 1960s and 1970s, there can be little doubt that times and cir-
cumstances have improved.”).
85 See, e.g., Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modified Nov. 21, 2009) (addressing Title
VII coverage requirements).
86 See King et al., supra note 83, at 54.
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These numerous studies fail to make any legal headlines, and the divide
between science and the law is rarely breached.  Most lawyers—and the judi-
ciary itself—remain unaware of the pure fact of discrimination, which is well
supported by the existing academic scholarship.  This Article seeks to bridge
the divide between science and the law.  While there is no room here to
perform an exhaustive review of the substantial (if not overwhelming) evi-
dence in this area, this Part will highlight a number of the more startling
studies that currently exist.  It will further discuss the numerous verdicts and
settlements that have occurred pursuant to Title VII and provide the most
recent governmental charge data in this area.  When all of this evidence is
considered, there can be little doubt as to the ongoing fact of discrimination
in the workplace.
This Article will present this evidence in two parts, showing how recent
studies, litigation, and EEOC data establish ongoing discrimination in the
workplace.  In Section III.A, this Article examines two areas that are often
discussed together, discrimination on the basis of race87 and sex.  In Section
III.B, this Article will look at two other areas that are often coupled
together—discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion.  This
pairing of topics allows this issue to be presented in a much more straightfor-
ward way.  After reviewing this scientific data, it is clear that discrimination
against protected groups is a fact.  And this fact—when supported by the
studies—should be permitted to be pled in a Title VII case of employment
discrimination.
A. Race and Sex Discrimination
Researchers have frequently studied the existence of employment dis-
crimination based on the race and sex of workers.  With respect to race-based
discrimination specifically, the research shows that racial minorities face
many barriers to employment and promotion.  Similarly, sex-based studies
reveal the uphill battle many women face trying to achieve equality in the
workplace.88  Jury awards in race and sex discrimination claims in recent
years demonstrate that those cases reaching trial may be particularly egre-
gious and result in large judgments.  Though workplace discrimination often
87 There is a substantial difference in claims brought on the basis of race and color
and there is an abundance of literature that addresses this distinction. See, e.g., Race/Color
Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/race_color.cfm (last visited Aug.
18, 2017) (providing guidance on race and color discrimination).  While this Article does
not largely address this distinction, it is an important consideration to note.
88 Sexual harassment, a special subset of gender discrimination claims, has also gar-
nered widespread attention recently. See Sarah Almukhtar et al., After Weinstein: 71 Men
Accused of Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein
.html; see also Doug Criss, The (Incomplete) List of Powerful Men Accused of Sexual Harassment
After Harvey Weinstein, CNN (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/25/us/list-of-
accused-after-weinstein-scandal-trnd/index.html.  The growing amount of evidence in this
area suggests that harassment is widespread and pervasive in our society as well.
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takes subtle forms, news accounts of explicit discrimination and bias in Amer-
ican culture further illustrate that blatant discrimination still remains preva-
lent in society and likely influences employment decisions.
Researchers have examined workplace discrimination based on race and
sex to determine how discrimination has evolved over time and have studied
the types of environments where discrimination remains pervasive.  For
example, a 2015 study examines how female applicants for a management
position in a traditionally male-oriented field were perceived as a better fit
for the job when they characterized their strengths through the use of adjec-
tives often associated with male traits.89  The study used 674 participants to
evaluate interviewees of both genders on how likely the applicants would be
to succeed in a supervisory engineering position.90  Male and female inter-
viewees were trained to act in a similar way in a staged and recorded inter-
view.91  The interviewees answered a number of common interview questions
in an identical manner but differed their responses to an inquiry about their
strengths by using agentic, communal, or neutral adjectives.92  Agentic traits
are achievement-oriented words often associated with men whereas commu-
nal traits are relationship-oriented words often associated with women.93
Both male and female interviewees were rated more favorably when they
used agentic traits to describe their strengths.94  Women particularly benefit-
ted from using these adjectives as participants rated female applicants using
agentic traits to be a better fit for the job than other females.95  Male appli-
cants who used communal traits to characterize themselves were found to be
a worse fit for the position.96  These results show that male and female job
applicants are judged differently based on implicit perceptions of the traits
applicants use to describe themselves, significantly impacting females apply-
ing for management positions in traditionally male-dominated fields.97
Research has also shown that males are 25% more likely to get a pay
increase when they ask for one.98  This result “challenges the myth that the
gender pay gap is a result of women not asking for more money because
they’re less ambitious, more worried about upsetting their boss, or afraid of
being seen as too pushy.”99  Similarly, researchers continue to study the pay
89 See Jennifer L. Wessel et al., Should Women Applicants “Man Up” for Traditionally Mas-
culine Fields? Effectiveness of Two Verbal Identity Management Strategies, 39 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q.
243, 249 (2015).
90 Id. at 245–46.
91 Id. at 247.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 243.
94 Id. at 249.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 251.
98 Ivana Kottasova, Women Do Ask for Pay Raises, They Just Don’t Get Them, CNN MONEY
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/06/news/women-pay-gap-ask/.
99 Id.
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gap between men and women, which persists even when childbirth and edu-
cation are taken into account.100  Indeed,
[t]welve years after giving birth for the first time, women are making 33%
less per hour than men, according to research by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies [(IFS)]. . . . The IFS also found that the pay gap between highly
educated women and men has not closed at all in 20 years, and remains
stuck at just over 20%.101
Another recent study examined the difficulty women have obtaining
jobs that require math-based skills.102  Indeed, experiments have shown “that
bad decisions in favor of a male candidate occurred 14% more often than
bad decisions in favor of a female candidate, regardless of the scenario.”103
In addition to entry-level positions, studies further examine the discrimina-
tion that exists at the executive level.  Where women are just as qualified as
men for high-level jobs, for example, “female candidates for a CEO position
are 28 percent less likely to be hired.”104  Indeed, research has found that
females are highly underrepresented at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms
and only “2.5 percent of those executives were female, and just 0.5 percent of
CEO or chairperson roles were held by women. . . . As of February 2016, just
20 of the S&P 500 companies are run by women, according to Catalyst, a
nonprofit research group that promotes workplace inclusion.”105
Sex discrimination has also found its way into academia.  One study per-
formed by researchers at Columbia University revealed that prospective doc-
toral student emails with minority- or female-sounding names received fewer
responses from faculty than those with white male-sounding names, varying
substantially by discipline with higher prevalence at private institutions that
paid more.106  This type of sex discrimination has been found to exist outside
of the workplace context as well.  For example, research has demonstrated
that car dealerships tend to offer much lower prices on identical cars to white
men than to black men and white women.107
A well-known (but more dated) study tested for the existence of discrimi-
nation in hiring practices at major city orchestras.  Researchers Claudia Gol-
100 Ivana Kottasova, Mothers Still Lag Behind in Pay for Years, CNN BUS. (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/23/news/economy/gender-pay-gap-mothers/?iid=EL.
101 Id.
102 Robin Mordfin, Why Women Find It Harder to Get Math-Based Jobs, CHI. BOOTH REV.
(June 27, 2014), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/summer-2014/why-women-
find-it-harder-to-get-math-based-jobs.
103 Id.




106 Katherine L. Milkman et al., Heterogeneity in Discrimination?: A Field Experiment
(2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/researcharchive/arti
cles/5642.
107 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 817 (1991).
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din and Cecilia Rouse tested whether or not female musicians were
discriminated against in violin auditions.108  In the 1970s and 1980s, orches-
tras revised their audition policies and started to use a “screen” barrier to
conceal the identity of the candidate from the group evaluating the audi-
tion.109  In order to determine the impact of this approach, Goldin and
Rouse reviewed the personnel records of orchestras from 1950 to 1995.110
They estimated that the screen increased the probability that a female would
be advanced out of a preliminary audition round by approximately 50%.111
Further, this approach increased the likelihood that the female candidate
would be selected in the final round of the audition.112  Goldin and Rouse
concluded that “blind” auditions can account for 30% of the increase in the
female proportion of new hires.113  It also possibly explains 25% of the
increase in women in orchestras since 1970.114  These studies are merely
illustrative, as there is a tremendous amount of other research that has been
done—and is ongoing—in this area.115
Studies have further shown the ongoing nature of race discrimination
claims.  In Professor Dorothy Brown’s article Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First
Century, for example, she noted that “[p]olls show the skepticism of White
108 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Audi-
tions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715 (2000).  For an excellent review of this
study and a discussion of the importance of social science research in the workplace, see
Bornstein, supra note 20.
109 Goldin & Rouse, supra note 108, at 716.
110 Id. at 724.




115 See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 8 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf (“We found that
when employees were asked, in surveys using a randomly representative sample (called a
‘probability sample’), if they had experienced ‘sexual harassment,’ without that term being
defined in the survey, approximately one in four women (25%) reported experiencing
‘sexual harassment’ in the workplace.  This percentage was remarkably consistent across
probability surveys.  When employees were asked the same question in surveys using conve-
nience samples (in lay terms, a convenience sample is not randomly representative because
it uses respondents that are convenient to the researcher (e.g., student volunteers or
respondents from one organization)), with sexual harassment not being defined, the rate
rose to 50% of women reporting they had been sexually harassed.”); Eileen Patten, Racial,
Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW RES. CTR. (July 1, 2016), http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-u-s-
despite-some-progress/ (“[A] 2013 Pew Research Center survey found that about one-in-
five women (18%) say they have faced gender discrimination at work, including 12% who
say they have earned less than a man doing the same job because of their gender.  By
comparison, one-in-ten men say they have faced gender-based workplace discrimination,
including 3% who say their gender has been a factor in earning lower wages.”).
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Americans concerning the continuing existence of racism.”116  She stated
that “[a]lmost two-thirds of Whites are satisfied with society’s treatment of
both Blacks and Hispanics, while almost two-thirds of Blacks and slightly
more than half of Hispanics are dissatisfied with their treatment.”117
In a 2009 study, researchers examining the existence of racial discrimi-
nation in low-wage labor markets found that a clear racial hierarchy exists
among similarly situated candidates and that minorities often encounter sub-
tle discriminatory practices that disadvantage their employment opportuni-
ties.118  Researchers in the study placed applicants into two groups, and each
group included a white male, an African American male, and a Puerto Rican
(Latino) male, who were matched by their attractiveness and interpersonal
skills.119  Each applicant used a resume created for the study, which reflected
that the applicant possessed a high school education and entry-level work
experience.120  The teams only differed in that the white applicant of one
team listed a felony conviction on the employment applications.121  The
team without a felon applicant applied to 171 employers in New York City
across a wide range of low paying jobs.122  The white applicant in this team
received a call back or job offer 31% of the time while the Latino applicant
received the same only 25.2% of the time and the African American appli-
cant only 15.2% of the time.123  These results demonstrate that an African
American male must search twice as long as a similarly situated white male
before being contacted for an interview or offered a position.124  Results
from the group with the white felon applicant were potentially even more
alarming, with the white felon receiving a callback or employment offer
17.2% of the time compared with an African American applicant receiving
the same only 13% of the time.125  These results suggest that the disadvan-
tage of being an African American applicant when seeking employment is
approximate to the disadvantage of having a felony conviction for an other-
wise equally qualified white applicant.126
Additionally, the same study demonstrated patterns of discriminatory
behavior when researchers examined the applicants’ field notes.127
Researchers categorized this behavior as either categorical exclusion, shifting
116 Dorothy A. Brown, Fighting Racism in the Twenty-First Century, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1485, 1491 (2004).
117 Id.
118 See Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment,
74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 793 (2009).
119 Id. at 781.
120 Id. at 777, 781.
121 Id. at 782.
122 Id. at 777, 784.
123 Id. at 784.
124 Id. at 785.
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 Id. at 786.
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standards, or race-coded job channeling.128  Categorical exclusion revealed
automatic rejection of an applicant based exclusively on race, which tended
to occur where there was little direct contact between the applicant and the
hiring employer.129  Shifting standards described a process by which employ-
ers changed the importance of job qualifications based on the applicant’s
race.130  For example, a white applicant with no relevant experience was
given the benefit of the doubt, while an equally qualified African American
applicant was simply rejected.131  Race-coded job channeling occurred when
employers would steer minority applicants into positions with less frequent
consumer contact and higher levels of physical labor.132  In these instances,
the Latino applicants were channeled down five times and the African Ameri-
can applicants were channeled down nine times.133  However, the white
applicants were channeled down only once (the felon applicant) and were
channeled up six times.134  Researchers suggested that job channeling may
result from the employers’ own assumptions about an applicant’s race or on
the customers’ expectations.135  The frequency at which this type of discrimi-
natory behaviors occurred strongly suggests discrimination across the work-
place, and real-life applicants with fewer skills and less experience than those
presented by the study may face even stronger forms of discrimination.136
Several other social science studies have shown the pervasive nature of
discrimination in the hiring practices of employers.  For example, a study by
the National Bureau of Economic Research evaluated the potential employ-
ment impact of having a name that is associated with either whites or African
Americans.137  In the study, economists Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mul-
lainathan responded to help wanted ads for jobs in sales, administrative sup-
port, clerical services, and customer services in the Boston Globe and Chicago
Tribune newspapers.138  Bertrand and Mullainathan selected names that were
associated with African Americans or whites.139  The names were then ran-
domly assigned to resumes and submitted to the employers.140   For some job
postings, the resume would include a name associated with whites, and in
other postings that same resume may include a name associated with African
128 Id. at 786–87.
129 Id. at 787.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 789.
132 Id. at 787.
133 Id. at 791.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See id. at 793.
137 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873.pdf.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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Americans.141  Bertrand and Mullainathan then kept track of how many
callbacks each resume received.142  Their study demonstrated that resumes
with white-sounding names received 50% more callbacks than those with
black-sounding names, resulting in their conclusion of the presence of dis-
crimination in hiring.143
A 2007 examination of discrimination claims filed in Ohio demonstrated
similar forms of discrimination against minorities and females.144  The study
examined 6162 sex-based and 9013 race-based discrimination cases where
investigators found probable cause or a favorable settlement for the charging
party was reached over a fifteen-year period in helping to determine and
define the role of social closure in workplace discrimination.145  Social clo-
sure is defined as “the process by which collectivities seek to maximize advan-
tage by restricting access and privileges to others.”146  The case files focused
on five types of injuries: exclusion, expulsion, promotion, demotion, and har-
assment.147  Researchers concluded that discrimination claims based on race
most often arose from differing enforcement of rules, subjective soft-skill
evaluation, and racial hierarchy maintenance.148  Victims of sex discrimina-
tion were most often affected by characterizations based on gender appropri-
ateness, presumptions of dependability related to pregnancy, and
harassment.149  The study theorized that employers discriminate only where
the organization and policies allow them the flexibility to do so.150  The
results of this study of actual discrimination thus enhances the more empiri-
cally based studies discussed earlier.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2–3; see also Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination
Through Controlled Experiments, 23 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 25 (1994) (finding black employ-
ment applicants in the Washington D.C. area were treated worse than equally qualified
white applicants more than one-fifth of the time); Ana P. Nunes & Brad Seligman, Treat-
ment of Caucasian and African-American Applicants by San Francisco Bay Area Employ-
ment Agencies: Results of a Study Utilizing “Testers” (July 1999) (unpublished
manuscript). But see Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Hiring Bias Study: Resumes with Black, White, His-
panic Names Treated the Same, CHI. TRIBUNE (May 4, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-bias-hiring-0504-biz-20160503-story.html (explaining economists at the
University of Missouri applied the resume analysis to Hispanic, white, and black applicants
and found no statistically significant differences across race, ethnic, or gender groups).
144 See generally Vincent J. Roscigno et al., Social Closure and Processes of Race/Sex Employ-
ment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 16 (2007).
145 Id. at 18.  The time frame was limited to 1988 through 2003, and all allegations were
filed in Ohio.  Id.
146 Id. at 21.
147 Id. at 27.
148 Id. at 28.
149 Id. at 34.
150 Id. at 45–46; see also Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination:
The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
553 (2005) (finding study participants more likely to act on explicit and implicit bias in
environment that promoted discrimination).
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Other research has revealed race discrimination in varying areas of the
economy.  For example, one study demonstrated that “[w]hite drivers were
tipped 61% more than black drivers . . . and 64% more than . . . ‘other
minority’ drivers.”151  Moreover, other studies have shown that apartment
application emails written by those with African American– and Arab-sound-
ing names received far fewer positive responses than those with white-sound-
ing names.152  And another study found that tenant applications by Asian
American males and females resulted in the highest number of landlord
responses, while those applications by African American males and females
resulted in the least.153  Discrimination can even be seen in the emerging
technology sector, as research demonstrates that Airbnb applicants with Afri-
can American–sounding names were 16% less likely to be accepted than
those with white-sounding names.154
Although more open, overt discrimination may no longer present as
great of a threat now when compared to past decades, discrimination is still
pervasive in society and often occurs much more subtly.  For example, the
Baltimore County Council considered legislation that would prevent land-
lords from discriminating against renters based on the nature of a renter’s
income.155  Other jurisdictions, including Washington, D.C., Chicago, Phila-
delphia, Seattle, and San Francisco, all have similar laws in place.156  Without
these laws, landlords could discriminate against certain protected groups,
including blacks or single mothers who pay their rent with vouchers.157
Other practices that may have a disproportionate impact on minorities and
women still remain in use, such as the use of credit records or arrest history
to screen job applicants.158  The evidence of these practices, along with the
statistics and surveys outlined above demonstrate that discrimination is still
quite pervasive in today’s society, and is a challenge for individuals both
151 Ian Ayres et al., Essay, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114
YALE L.J. 1613, 1627 (2005).  The “other minority” drivers identified by the research
included those of Arab and Indian backgrounds. Id. at 1623 n.33.
152 See Adrian G. Carpusor & William E. Loges, Rental Discrimination and Ethnicity in
Names, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 934 (2006).
153 See Michelle E. Feldman & Allyson J. Weseley, Which Name Unlocks the Door? The Effect
of Tenant Race/Ethnicity on Landlord Response, 43 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. E416, E416
(2013); see also Andrew Hanson & Zackary Hawley, Do Landlords Discriminate in the Rental
Housing Market? Evidence from an Internet Field Experiment in US Cities, 70 J. URB. ECON. 99, 99
(2011) (statistically significant discrimination against those with African Ameri-
can–sounding names in rental housing market).
154 Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a
Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. 1, 1 (2017).
155 See Emily Badger, A Pervasive Form of Housing Discrimination That’s Still Legal, WASH.




158 See Donna Ballman, Does Discrimination Still Exist? Of Course It Does, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 29, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/red-room/donna-ballman-
does-discri_b_939853.html.
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inside and outside of the workplace.  Though some may no longer see dis-
crimination as an ongoing problem, the scientific research proves otherwise.
Additional studies show that white applicants tend to receive longer job
interviews than minorities, and that they are also treated in a friendlier fash-
ion.159  Studies have shown the added stress that this type of discrimination
can bring to the lives of minority workers.  For example, “[w]hile 66% of the
women scientists . . . studied (including white women) reported having to
provide more evidence of competence than men, 77% of black women said
they experienced that.  ‘Black women often feel like they can’t make a single
mistake . . . . They would lose all credibility.’”160  There can be no real
debate over the types of stress associated with discrimination.  This sampling
of studies is only a representative example of the enormous amount of help-
ful research that is going on in this important area.161
A review of EEOC charge data shows that employment discrimination
claims for both race and sex remained fairly steady from 1997 until 2006
when both types of claims increased significantly in the total number of
charges filed with the Agency.162  The EEOC has released an analysis of the
159 See Tanzina Vega, Working While Brown: What Discrimination Looks Like Now, CNN
BUS. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/economy/racial-discrim
ination-work/.
160 Id. (quoting University of California Hastings College of Law Professor Joan
Williams).
161 See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 115, at 12 (“In another survey based on a conve-
nience sample measuring racial and ethnic harassment, researchers found that 70% of the
respondents reported experiencing some form of verbal harassment and 45% reported
experiencing exclusionary behaviors.  In addition, 69% of respondents reported witnessing
at least one ethnically-harassing behavior in the last two years at work and 36% of respon-
dents who reported that they had not experienced direct harassment indicated that they
had knowledge about the harassment of other co-workers.” (footnotes omitted)); Patten,
supra note 115 (“A new Pew Research Center report . . . finds that roughly two-thirds
(64%) of blacks say black people in the U.S. are generally treated less fairly than whites in
the workplace; just 22% of whites and 38% of Hispanics agree.  About two-in-ten black
adults (21%) and 16% of Hispanics say that in the past year they have been treated unfairly
in hiring, pay or promotion because of their race or ethnicity; just 4% of white adults say
the same.” (citation omitted)).
162 See Race-Based Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997–FY 2017, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race.cfm (last visited June 27, 2017) [hereinaf-
ter Race-Based Charges]; Sex-Based Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997–FY 2017, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sex.cfm (last visited June 27, 2017)
[hereinafter Sex-Based Charges].  This data does not include charges filed with state or local
fair employment practice agencies. See Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997
Through FY 2017, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(last visited Aug. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Charge Statistics].  As discussed earlier in this Sec-
tion, this Article focuses primarily on race rather than color discrimination.  It is worth
noting, however, that during fiscal year 2016, the EEOC received 3102 charges of color
discrimination. See Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Releases Fis-
cal Year 2016 Enforcement and Litigation Data (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www1.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/1-18-17a.cfm [hereinafter Press Release].  These charges reflect
3.4% of all charges filed, and cause to believe discrimination occurred was found by the
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91,503 charges of employment discrimination filed with the Agency during
fiscal year 2016.163  Overall, the government resolved many of the charges
and obtained over $482 million for victims of discrimination in private, fed-
eral and state and local government workplaces.164  During the fiscal year
2016, the EEOC received 32,309 charges of race discrimination.165  These
charges represent 35.3% of all charges filed.166  Reasonable cause to believe
that discrimination occurred was found by the EEOC with respect to 709 of
these charges.167  During the same fiscal year, the Agency also received
26,934 charges of sex discrimination,168 reflecting 29.4% of all charges
filed.169  Reasonable cause was found by the EEOC with respect to 937 of
these charges.170
There have also been a substantial number of large verdicts and settle-
ments in the litigation brought in discrimination cases.  For example, an Afri-
can American worker accepted a $5 million punitive damages award,
reduced from the approximately $24 million in punitive damages awarded by
the jury, in a racial discrimination suit where the worker demonstrated that
he was paid less than his white coworkers, denied training and promotions in
favor of white employees, and subjected to racial slurs and graffiti at work.171
Moreover, a female firefighter received an award of more than $1.7 million
for a sexual harassment claim where she successfully established that her
complaints of sexual harassment were not properly investigated and instead
was instructed by her supervisor not to follow the policy for reporting sexual
harassment.172  These cases represent only a small sampling of the often-
breathtaking awards in the gender173 and racial discrimination area.174
Agency as to fifty-three of these charges. See Color-Based Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY
1997–FY 2017, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/color.cfm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2018).




167 See Race-Based Charges, supra note 162.
168 See Press Release, supra note 162.
169 Id.
170 See Sex-Based Charges, supra note 162.
171 Jury Verdict Summary, Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00794, 2012 Jury
Verdicts LEXIS 19219 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012).
172 Jury Verdict Summary, Sterud v. Orange Township., No. 10-cv-001314, 2013 Jury
Verdicts LEXIS 4151 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Franklin Cty. May 13, 2013).
173 Jury Verdict Summary, McPadden v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., No. 1:14-cv-00475,
2016 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 391 (D.N.H. Jan. 27, 2016) (“New Hampshire Federal Jury
Awards $31.2 Million To Wal-Mart Pharmacist In Her Action For Gender Discrimination
And Wrongful Termination.”); Jury Verdict Summary, EEOC v. Moreno Farms, No. 1:14-cv-
23181, 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 6908 (S.D. Fla. Sept 10, 2015) (“Florida Federal Jury
Awards Five Female Farm Workers $17.4 Million In Compensatory And Punitive Damages
For Hostile Work Environment, Including Sexual Assaults, And Retaliation.”); Jury Verdict
Summary, Rennenger v. Manley Toy Direct LLC, No. 4:10-cv-00400, 2015 Jury Verdicts
LEXIS 7326 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 5, 2015) (“Iowa Federal Jury Awards Over $11 Million To
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B. National Origin and Religious Discrimination
Researchers have also closely studied employment discrimination based
on the religion and national origin of current and prospective employees.
Much of the more recent research has looked at discrimination against Mus-
lims in the workplace.  Discrimination against this group increased substan-
tially following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States
and discrimination charges with the EEOC rose quickly after this tragic
event.175  The research has shown that workplace discrimination based on
religion and national origin is often subtle in nature.
While many workplace discrimination claims are frequently settled
under confidential terms, there have nonetheless been a number of substan-
tial verdicts in this area that have resulted in awards in excess of seven figures.
These high-profile claims involve blatant and extreme discrimination.  As dis-
cussed in greater detail below, many of these national original discrimination
verdicts also include at least one other claim against the defendant.
Female Customer Service Representative On Her Sexual Harassment Claims Against Toy
Company.”); Jury Verdict Summary, United States v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., No. 2:15-cv-
05264, 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 4884 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (“Honda’s Finance Division
Agrees To Pay $24 Million And Make Changes To Lending Policies That Discriminated
Against Minorities To Settle Equal Credit Opportunity Act Violation Suit Filed By Federal
Government In California Federal Court.”); Jury Verdict Summary, Robertson v. Hunter
Panels LLC, No. 2:13-cv-01047, 2015 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 2892 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2015)
(jury awarded $13,420,000 and found the “[employers] discriminated against [the
employee] because of her gender, that they subjected her to a hostile work environment
because of her gender, and that they unlawfully retaliated against her when they termi-
nated her employment”); Jury Verdict Summary, Juarez v. AutoZone Stores, Inc., No. 3:08-
cv-00417, 2014 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 12142 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2014) (the jury awarded
approximately $185,872,720 where the employer AutoZone discriminated against female
manager); Jury Verdict Summary, EEOC v. Four Amigos Travel, Inc., No. 8:11-cv-1163,
2013 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 6186 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2013) (jury awarded $20.3 million in
employment case).
174 Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Lawler Foods, Inc., No. 4:14-cv-03588,
2016 WL 2748677 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2016) (race and national origin discrimination law-
suit resulting in $1,042,000 settlement); Verdict and Settlement Summary, Houser v.
Pritzker, No. 1:10-cv-03105, 2016 WL 3970831 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2016) (workplace suit
resulting in $15 million settlement); Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Hillshire
Brands Co., No. 2:15-cv-1347, 2015 WL 9851919 (Dist. Ct. Tex. Dec. 22, 2015) (race dis-
crimination, racial harassment, and retaliation case resulting in $4 million settlement);
Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Dart Energy Corp., No. 2:13-cv-00198, 2014 WL
7365946 (D. Wyo. Sept. 9, 2014) (national origin and race discrimination retaliation case
resulting in $1.2 million settlement); Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Glob.
Horizons, Inc., No. 11-cv-00257, 2014 WL 7910524 (D. Haw. June 3, 2014) (case alleging
racial and national origin discrimination, harassment, and retaliation resulting in $2.4 mil-
lion settlement).
175 See generally Cassandra M. Gandara, Post-9/11 Backlash Discrimination in the Workplace:
Employers Beware of Potential Double Recovery, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 169, 173, 174 (2006)
(noting that, post-9/11, employers are concerned about liability through agency principles
for supporting terrorism after the passage of the PATRIOT Act, which creates pressures for
all employers to fully investigate current and prospective employees).
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Numerous studies have closely reviewed the continued and persistent
nature of religious and national origin discrimination, perhaps in part as a
response to the notable increase in EEOC charges filed in this area.  One
well known empirical study, It’s All in the Name,176 revealed that Arab males
must send, on average, 2.79 resumes for every one resume sent by white
males to receive an equal number of callbacks for a job interview.177  Sociolo-
gists sent two sets of identical resumes to employment openings found on the
internet: one set with traditionally white-associated names and one set with
traditionally Arab-associated names.178  White-associated names were
selected from the census report and Arab-associated names were chosen
from a baby book.179  The different sets of names were then tested for their
respective attributions.180  The positions applied to were chosen specifically
because Arab males were overrepresented in those fields.181  Additionally,
the researchers addressed any fluency concerns by representing all applicants
as having a degree and six years of work experience.182  Researchers catego-
rized responses in one of three ways: (1) equal treatment, meaning both
resumes were either called or not called; (2) white favored, meaning the
white resume received a response while the Arab resume failed to receive a
response; and (3) Arab favored, meaning the Arab resume received a
response while the white resume did not.183  Resumes were treated the same
89.38% of the time, usually with neither resume receiving any response at
all.184  However, white-favored responses consisted of 7.23% of responses
while Arab-favored responses consisted of only 2.63% of responses.185  As the
only difference between the resumes was the names of the applicants, these
results demonstrate discrimination based on religion and/or national origin
associated only with the applicant’s name.186
This type of name/association discrimination is a clear violation of Title
VII.187  And the results from It’s All in the Name188 strongly suggest the ongo-
ing prevalence of this form of discrimination.189  Other studies further illus-
176 Daniel Widner & Stephen Chicoine, It’s All in the Name: Employment Discrimination
Against Arab Americans, 4 SOC. F. 806 (2011).
177 Id. at 815.
178 Id. at 809.
179 Id. at 812.
180 Id. at 813.
181 Id. at 811.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 815.
184 Id. at 815–16 (referencing the “customer service manager” applications).
185 Id. at 816.
186 Id.
187 See Samorn Selim, Note, What Does Your Name Say About You? The Eighth Circuit Under-
cuts Name Association Discrimination Claims in EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 607, 614 (2007) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has approved name discrimi-
nation in § 1981 cases).
188 Widner & Chicoine, supra note 176.
189 See id. at 814–18; see also Ishra Solieman, Note, Born Osama: Muslim-American Employ-
ment Discrimination, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1069–70 (2009) (explaining that a well-educated
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trate that discriminatory practices on the basis of religion and national origin
are a regular occurrence in our society.190
A 2014 study examined green card applications and concluded that cer-
tain geographic areas were either more or less likely to be approved than a
control group based on their national origin when the reviewer had only
limited employment data.191  In House of Green Cards, researchers reviewed
198,442 green card applications filed between June 2008 and September
2011, examining potential disparities in approval status based on national
origin.192  The applicants came from 190 different nations and applied as
either “professionals with advanced degrees” or “skilled workers, profession-
als, and unskilled workers.”193  The study divided these applications into one
of seven geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania, Canada,
Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.194  Workers processing the
applications (“Processors”) did not have access to sex or race information but
were aware of the applicants’ names.195  This data was not made available to
the researchers,196 who further controlled for individual-level factors that
may have impacted approval rates.197  Canadian applicants were used as the
control group for the analysis, given their similarity to American workers
seeking similar employment.198  The applications were identified as
nonaudited and audited.199  Nonaudited applications were those where lim-
ited information was supplied to the Processors and comprised 87% of those
used in the research.200  Audited applications were randomly selected,
except in a few instances, and received a higher level of review by
Processors.201
After controlling for individual level factors, a review of the nonaudited
applications demonstrated significant statistical difference between approval
rates of applicants based on citizenship.202  The results showed that appli-
cants from Asia were 13.3% more likely than the control group to be
approved for green cards whereas applicants from Latin America were 23%
and qualified applicant with an Arab- and Muslim-associated name received notably better
response to his resume after substituting the associated name with only his initial).
190 See generally Sonia Ghumman et al., Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: A Review
and Examination of Current and Future Trends, 28 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 439, 440 (2013).
191 See Ben A. Rissing & Emilio J. Castilla, House of Green Cards: Statistical or Preference-
Based Inequality in the Employment of Foreign Nationals, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1226, 1240 (2014).
192 Id. at 1228, 1232.
193 Id. at 1233–34.
194 Id. at 1234.
195 Id. at 1237.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1240.
198 Id. at 1234.
199 Id. at 1237.
200 Id. at 1234.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1240.
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less likely than the control group to be approved.203  African and Middle
Eastern applicants also had a statistically significant difference compared to
the control group—and were 21.1% less likely and 16.9% less likely to be
approved, respectively.204  Interestingly, the review of the audited applica-
tions showed no statistically significant difference in approval rates based on
citizenship.205  The only exceptions were those applicants from Japan and
South Korea, possibly as a result of existing bias and stereotypes about the
work ethic of these groups.206  These results suggest that a more detailed
review is likely to result in fairer results, as was seen with the audited applica-
tions.207  Interviews with select Processors confirmed that national origin was
involved in the approval of applications.208  One Processor stated that appli-
cants from nations that are “friendly” with the United States were more likely
to be approved than those from countries that are less “friendly,” specifically
identifying Middle Eastern nations.209  Another Processor indicated that his
approach was “instinctive, kind of wanting to protect other Americans.”210
Several other studies reveal ongoing discrimination in this area.  For
example, research suggests that employers were even looking into the pro-
tected bases of potential workers as part of the hiring process.  One study
concluded that employers who analyze job applicants’ social media informa-
tion return calls to Muslim applicants at a rate 13% lower than to Christian
applicants.211  Other research determined that the resumes of Arab appli-
cants received significantly lower job ratings than equally qualified white
applicants, using the degree of Arab identification based on organizational
affiliations.212  And other studies showed that wearing a hijab negatively cor-
related with purported job availability, permission to complete job applica-
tions, and job callbacks.213  Still other studies showed that Hispanic work
applicants received fewer job offers than Anglo applicants in major metropol-
itan areas.214
Additional research demonstrates the impact of a job applicant’s name
with respect to national origin and religion, finding that Arab job applicants
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 1243.
206 Id. at 1246.
207 Id. at 1240.
208 See id. at 1247.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Alessandro Acquisti & Christina M. Fong, An Experiment in Hiring Discrimination
via Online Social Networks (Mar. 12, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2031979.
212 Eva Derous et al., Hiring Discrimination Against Arab Minorities: Interactions Between
Prejudice and Job Characteristics, 22 HUM. PERFORMANCE 297, 312 (2009).
213 Sonia Ghumman & Ann Marie Ryan, Not Welcome Here: Discrimination Towards Women
Who Wear the Muslim Headscarf, 66 HUM. REL. 671, 688 (2013).
214 Genevieve M. Kenney & Douglas A. Wissoker, An Analysis of the Correlates of Discrimi-
nation Facing Young Hispanic Job-Seekers, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 674, 682 (1994).
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received fewer callbacks than white job applicants, particularly for manage-
ment-level positions.215  And other research determined that applicants with
resumes that suggested a Muslim religious identity received the lowest num-
ber of responses of any group from employers in the New England region.216
This type of discrimination exists in academia as well.  One study showed that
emails sent to white faculty concerning graduate training by individuals with
Chinese-sounding names led to a lower response rate and subsequent agree-
ments than almost identical emails that included Chinese individuals adopt-
ing Anglo-sounding names.217
Similar to the findings of racial discrimination discussed in Section III.A,
discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion also pervades the
housing sector.  One study established that Arab Americans posting housing
ads in Los Angeles, New York City, Detroit, and Houston received substan-
tially fewer positive responses than whites.218  Another study established that
Hispanics portrayed as recent immigrants received far fewer positive
responses to rental requests than Hispanics who presented themselves as
more fully assimilated into American culture.219  These studies are simply
representative of a much larger problem.  A significant amount of other
research further demonstrates the continued prevalence of discrimination
on the basis of national origin220 and religion.221
As discussed above, following 9/11, the number of religious discrimina-
tion and national origin discrimination claims filed with the EEOC has grown
215 Widner & Chicoine, supra note 176, at 818.
216 Bradley R.E. Wright et al., Religious Affiliation and Hiring Discrimination in New
England: A Field Experiment, 34 RES. SOC. STRATIFICATION & MOBILITY 111, 119, 119 tbl.1
(2013).
217 Xian Zhao & Monica Biernat, “Welcome to the U.S.” But “Change Your Name”? Adopting
Anglo Names and Discrimination, 70 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 65 (2017).
218 S. Michael Gaddis & Raj Ghoshal, Arab American Housing Discrimination, Ethnic Com-
petition, and the Contact Hypothesis, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 282, 290 fig.1
(2015).
219 Andrew Hanson & Michael Santas, Field Experiment Tests for Discrimination Against
Hispanics in the U.S. Rental Housing Market, 81 S. ECON. J. 135, 136–37 (2014).
220 For example, from 1998 to 2007, the Discrimination Research Center (DRC)
engaged in research to examine the impact of ethnic names in the hiring process at tem-
porary agencies located in California. See Sandra R. McCandless & Khoa Ngo, Sonnen-
schein Nath & Rosenthal, Employment Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin and
Religion in the Post-9/11 Era 5 (July 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://apps.ameri
canbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/2008/pdf/McCandless.pdf.  The research demonstrated
that resumes with traditionally South Asian– or Arab-sounding names received the lowest
response in five of seven California areas. Id. at 6; see also Bendick et al., supra note 143
(concluding that African American employment applicants in the Washington D.C. region
were treated less favorably than equally qualified white applicants more than one-fifth of
the time).
221 Both scholars and the existing research have addressed the rise in religious discrimi-
nation following the tragic events of 9/11. See Ghumman et al., supra note 190, at 447
(noting multiple factors that have contributed to increased level of religious discrimination
in the United States).
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substantially.222  Many scholars argue that societal tensions after these events
spilled into the working environment, which was “particularly to the detri-
ment of people from a Middle Eastern or Arabic background.”223
EEOC charge statistics reveal that workplace discrimination claims based
on national origin and religion224 have increased almost every year since
2001, with all years after 2001 higher than those before 2001.225  During fis-
cal year 2016, the EEOC received 9840 charges of national origin discrimina-
tion,226 representing 10.8% of all charges filed.227  Reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination occurred was found by the EEOC with respect to
321 of these charges.228  During the same year, the EEOC received 3825
charges of religious discrimination.229  These charges represent 4.2% of all
charges filed,230 and reasonable cause to believe that discrimination
occurred was found by the EEOC with respect to 121 of these charges.231
Many jury awards in these cases have received widespread attention.  For
example, a jury awarded a Missouri worker $5.1 million in a hostile environ-
ment claim based on harassment she encountered after converting to
222 See Gandara, supra note 175, at 172–73 (stating that prior to 9/11, the highest num-
ber of charges filed with the EEOC based on national origin discrimination in a single year
was 7792 in fiscal year 2000, while over 9000 national origin charges were filed with the
Agency in fiscal year 2002 alone).
223 McCandless & Ngo, supra note 220, at 2.  Employment discrimination claims based
on national origin and religion increased notably after 9/11, with these claims increasing
by 17% and 35%, respectively, between 2001 and 2007. Id. at 2 & nn.1–2.
224 Religious discrimination claims have risen sharply when compared to other catego-
ries protected by Title VII. See Ghumman et al., supra note 190, at 440 (noting that
between 2000 and 2010, religious discrimination claims increased by 96% over the course
of the decade in comparison to race (24% increase), sex (15%), and national origin
(45%)).  In addition, “the EEOC has consistently been able to obtain millions of dollars
from employers for religion-based discrimination claims.”  Gandara, supra note 175, at 187
(noting that the amount of monetary benefits recovered by the EEOC in 2001 from relig-
ious discrimination claims increased more than 907% when compared to claims from
1992).
225 See Charge Statistics, supra note 162. See generally Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes:
An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 111, 112–13 (2007) (discussing settlement rate of discrimination charges and stating
that approximately 70% of charges with the Agency may end in settlement).
226 See Press Release, supra note 162.
227 Id.
228 National Origin-Based Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997–FY 2017, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/origin.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
229 See Charge Statistics, supra note 162.
230 See id.
231 Religion-Based Charges (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997–FY 2017, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).  In
light of these increases, former EEOC Chair Jenny Yang stated: “Despite the progress that
has been made, we continue to see discrimination in both overt and subtle forms.  The
ongoing challenge of combating employment discrimination is what makes EEOC’s work
as important as ever.” See Press Release, supra note 162.
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Islam.232  Similarly, a federal jury in California found for a female employee
whose coworkers and supervisors made many negative remarks about her
ethnicity.233  The jury awarded her over $182.6 million.234  Similarly, a jury
awarded a worker who was a Jehovah’s Witness $1.37 million after her
employer, the Community Development Commission of the County of Los
Angeles, required that she participate in activities that she believed were con-
trary to her religion.235  And a Michigan jury awarded a Muslim employee
$1.185 million for harassment he encountered after the 9/11 terrorist attacks
and for the employer’s failure to make accommodations that would permit
the worker to exercise freedom of religion.236  This sampling of cases repre-
sents only a handful of the large verdicts based on national origin237 and
religious238 discrimination in the workplace.
The empirical research illustrating the prevalence of employment dis-
crimination based on religion and national origin, combined with the large
awards given to plaintiffs in these types of claims, demonstrates the adversity
232 Jury Verdict Summary, Bashir v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 1016-cv-38690, 2015 Dolan
Media Jury Verdicts LEXIS 11123 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 13, 2012) (employee referred to as
“one of those bomb people” and as wearing that “hat thing”).
233 Jury Verdict Summary, Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare W., No. 2:09-cv-2972,
2012 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 2486 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2012).
234 Id.
235 Jury Verdict Summary, Mayo v. Cmty. Dev. Comm’n of L.A., No. BC486184, 2014
Jury Verdicts LEXIS 10547 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2014).
236 Jury Verdict Summary, Aboubaker v. County of Washtenaw, No. 2:11-cv-13001, 2014
Nat. Jury Verdict Review LEXIS 28 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying Muslim worker
ability to attend religious ceremonies and passing him over for promotion).
237 See, e.g., Verdict and Settlement Summary, Miranda v. Alaska Longline, LLC, No.
2:15-cv-00148, 2017 WL 1900361 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 2017) (national origin discrimina-
tion case resulting in $1,850,000 settlement); Jury Verdict Summary, Al-Habash v. Ray-
theon Co., No. 4:1-cv-450, 2016 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 10326 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2016)
(federal jury awarded Muslim American worker over $800,000 for national origin discrimi-
nation and retaliation claim); Verdict and Settlement Summary, Paspuel v. Pro Star Truck-
ing, No. 2:14-cv-00910, 2016 WL 2751000 (D. Utah Mar. 21, 2016) (plaintiffs were harassed
about their legal status in the United States, given less desirable shifts and tasks, and forced
to perform tasks with unsafe equipment, and awarded $1,455,004); Verdict and Settlement
Summary, EEOC v. Vail Run Resort Cmty. Ass’n, No. 1:15-cv-01592, 2016 WL 917681 (D.
Colo. Feb. 10, 2016) (national origin discrimination case resulting in $1,000,000
settlement).
238 Jury Verdict Summary, Nichols v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp. & Cent. Mgmt. Sys., No. 1:12-
cv-01789, 2016 Jury Verdicts LEXIS 9764 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016) (failure to accommodate
religion and unlawful termination and retaliation claims resulted in $1,500,000 jury
award); Jury Verdict Summary, Saleh vs. Pretty Girl, Inc., No. 09-cv-1769, 2014 NY Jury
Verdicts Review LEXIS 310 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2014) (case alleging national origin and relig-
ious discrimination resulting in $4,715,000 verdict, including $2,555,000 in punitive dam-
ages); Aboubaker, 2014 Nat. Jury Verdict Review LEXIS 28 (case alleging employment
discrimination on basis of religion, race, and national origin resulting in $1,185,520 jury
award).  The Fourth Circuit upheld a $590,000 jury verdict against a company for forcing
worker to retire because it would not accommodate his religious beliefs. See EEOC v. Con-
sol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 137, 140 (4th Cir. 2017).
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still faced by these groups in the workplace.  The social science research and
EEOC data clearly illustrate that national origin and religious discrimination
are both quite prevalent in the workplace.  This Section has provided a
review of some of the important research in this area.  Scientific studies,
EEOC data, and recent litigation results all support the undeniable fact of
existing workplace discrimination.  The information presented here is non-
exhaustive, but a more thorough analysis would only bolster this conclusion.
And, like any other fact, the existence of workplace discrimination should be
permitted to be pled in a Title VII complaint of workplace discrimination.
The following Parts will explain how pleading the fact of discrimination can
be properly achieved under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This dis-
cussion begins with an analysis of how to attach this type of information to
the complaint.
IV. ATTACHMENT TO THE PLEADINGS
As detailed above, the fact of discrimination is well supported in the sci-
entific literature, the EEOC data, and the litigation statistics.  While such
indisputable evidence exists, this information has failed to make its way into
the public’s collective knowledge.  Indeed, the opposite approach—that dis-
crimination is largely a vestige of the past—appears to be the more popular
view of the courts and general public, as evidenced by the rate at which Title
VII claims are being rejected in the judicial system.239
The more precise legal question, then, is how this type of background
social science information and data should be introduced into an employ-
ment discrimination proceeding to prevent otherwise valid Title VII claims
from being unnecessarily dismissed.  Fortunately, the answer is relatively
straightforward and will be discussed at length in Part V.  The fact of discrimi-
nation should be pled in the complaint, and the supporting social science
data and other evidence should be attached to the pleadings.  The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure generally permit such attachments, though the
courts vary on their willingness to consider this type of information under
these same rules.
It is helpful to understand how attaching documents to a civil com-
plaint—and more particularly to a Title VII pleading—works in practice
before fully addressing the approach proposed by this Article.  This Part thus
discusses the procedural rules under federal law for attaching documents to a
pleading.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would generally permit Title
VII litigants to attach social science research as an exhibit where that
research is expressly referenced in the text of the complaint itself.  The
courts disagree on the types of exhibits that are permitted under the federal
rules, and more precisely there is disagreement with respect to what consti-
tutes a “written instrument” under Rule 10(c).240  This rule provides: “A
statement in a pleading may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same
239 See Charge Statistics, supra note 162.
240 See infra notes 229–38 and accompanying text.
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pleading or in any other pleading or motion.  A copy of a written instrument
that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”241
Generally speaking, then, for any attachments to be permissible under
this rule the plaintiff must expressly reference the exhibit in the complaint
itself and the attachment should further be central to the allegations
involved.242  Where permitted by the courts and federal rules, exhibits that
are incorporated by reference in the complaint can properly be considered
in a dismissal proceeding.243  Indeed, if there are discrepancies between the
attachments and the complaint itself, the court is free to accord greater
weight to the exhibit where appropriate.244  Notably, where the attachment is
not considered a “written instrument” under Rule 10(c), a dismissal motion
will be converted into a summary judgment motion.245  When this occurs,
the courts can consider a broader range of information, including informa-
tion beyond the pleading itself.246  It is further possible that a court in these
circumstances may conclude that it has insufficient information with respect
to the motion, and allow the matter to proceed to discovery.247
There is—unfortunately—widespread disagreement over the precise
definition of “written instrument” under the rules.  Typically, contractual-
type documents fall within this definition.248  Outside of this, however, sub-
stantial disagreement exists as to what constitutes a “written instrument” and
decisions on this question are often jurisdiction and fact specific.249  Broadly
speaking, then, “documents attached to the pleadings become part of the
pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss . . . without con-
verting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.”250  As with any
241 FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).
242 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1327, at 442, 453 (3d ed. 2004); see also I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs. v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
936 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991).
243 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 242.
244 See Forrest v. Universal Sav. Bank, F.A., 507 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Massey v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 464 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2006)).
245 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); see also Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
861 F.3d 1081, 1103 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206,
1214 (10th Cir. 2004)).
246 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
247 See id. at 56(d).
248 Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d
331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)).
249 See, e.g., id. at 254 (adopting the Third Circuit’s decision in Rose, 871 F.2d 331, that
an affidavit is not a written instrument); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 467 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1991) (deciding that newspaper articles attached to a complaint were not “written
instruments” under Rule 10(c)); EEOC v. Prof’l Freezing Servs., LLC, 15 F. Supp. 3d 783,
785 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (deciding that EEOC charge attached to complaint was not central
to the claim). But see, e.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2013)
(allowing a video to be included as part of the pleadings).
250 Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335–36 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999)).  The district
court generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it
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procedural issue, litigants should further be advised to look to a court or
jurisdiction’s local rules for more specific and precise guidelines in this
area.251  Some jurisdictions may specifically provide additional guidance on
the issue of attaching exhibits to a federal complaint.
Confusing the issue somewhat further, there is additional disagreement
as to the types of exhibits that may be attached to an employment matter.252
Though there is far from unanimity on this question, many federal courts
have allowed litigants to include exhibits to the complaint in cases involving
workplace disputes.  One recent federal court decision is illustrative of this
view.  In that case, the court considered an EEOC charge that was attached to
the complaint as an exhibit and referenced it as part of its analysis.253  In
another recent case, a federal court permitted the plaintiff to attach an
EEOC charge in response to a dismissal motion, stating that it was central to
the claim because “the underlying allegations are violations of Title VII
discrimination.”254
In yet another recent decision, the EEOC attempted to include its own
compliance manual as an attachment to the complaint and (more to the
point of this Article) cited to social science research in the pleadings.  The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the compliance man-
ual was allowed at least some deference as “ ‘[t]he rulings, interpretations,
and opinions’ of an agency charged with enforcing a particular statute . . .
‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.’”255  As to the social science infor-
considers materials outside the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).  However, the court may
consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into
one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim
and (2) undisputed.  Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).  A document
need not be physically attached to a pleading to be incorporated by reference into it; if the
document’s contents are alleged in a complaint and no party questions those contents, the
court may consider such a document provided it meets the centrality requirements. See
Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 n.2. (11th Cir. 1999).
251 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE D.C., RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LCvR 5.1(e), at 22 (stating that litigants may only
attach to the pleadings information essential to the determination of the case); see also
COMMENCING A FEDERAL LAWSUIT: DRAFTING THE COMPLAINT, PRACTICAL LAW PRACTICE
NOTE 5-506-8600 (West 2019).
252 E.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2016); Davis v. City
of Atlanta, No. 1:16-cv-2037, 2017 WL 1376856, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2017), adopted by
2017 WL 1354848 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2017); Arnold v. UPS, Inc., No. 7:11-cv-00118, 2012
WL 1035441, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2012).
253 Davis, 2017 WL 1376856, at *2 (citing Complaint at 5, Davis, 2017 WL 1376856 (No.
1:16-cv-2037)).  “Within 180 days of the knowledge of the occurrence of the acts of which
she complains, Plaintiff filed a written charge with the [EEOC] by notice dated February
18, 2015.  (Attached as Exhibit ‘A’).”  Complaint at 5, supra.
254 Arnold, 2012 WL 1035441, at *1.
255 Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).  While affording the manual some deference, the court was nonetheless
clear that the manual was not controlling in the case.  Id.
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mation included in the complaint with respect to race, the court concluded
that some of this information constituted “legal conclusions about the con-
cept of race.”256  When defining “race,” the court did look to social science
research and other cases.257
In conclusion, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) permits litigants to
attach “written instruments” to a complaint if certain requirements are satis-
fied.  While the rule is clear that such attachments are permissible, the pre-
cise terms of the rule have resulted in confusion in the rule’s application.
Nonetheless, there are a number of federal court decisions that have taken a
very permissible, flexible approach to Rule 10(c) when applied to employ-
ment discrimination cases.  It may ultimately take some time for all courts to
become comfortable with the approach advocated here.  Nonetheless,
including the types of attachments suggested in Part V of this Article will go a
long way toward educating the judiciary on this issue.
V. A NEW FRAMEWORK
As discussed throughout this Article, the plausibility standard has been
applied to employment discrimination claims in a particularly rigid way.  This
has given rise to an increase in the rate at which Title VII claims are being
dismissed.  And through a more anecdotal review, it is clear that some courts
are using the standard to reject otherwise viable claims that should be permit-
ted to proceed.  The question arises, then, as to how litigants can use the fact
of discrimination to circumvent this unfortunate (and unwarranted) trend.
The answer is straightforward—the fact of discrimination in the work-
place should be pled in the Title VII complaint itself.  By pleading the ongoing
fact of workplace discrimination, most Title VII claims will be seen as “plausi-
ble” from their onset.  How precisely to plead this fact is a more difficult
inquiry.  This Part establishes a four-part framework for pleading the fact of
discrimination.  This framework helps detail how litigants can help push
their claims from “conceivable” to “plausible,”258 and what defendants can
do to respond to such allegations.
This four-part framework applies exclusively to Title VII cases and may
be properly applied to any claim arising under this statute.  This Part will
analyze each of the elements of this four-part framework, which is summa-
rized here:
1. The complaint should detail the fact of workplace discrimination
and the protected class at issue.
2. The fact of discrimination should specify the particular type of
adverse action involved.
3. The complaint should attach relevant social science evidence, EEOC
data, and litigation statistics.
256 Id. at 1022.
257 See id. at 1026–28.
258 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–84 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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4. The defendant should be given the opportunity to properly rebut
this fact.
Each of these elements is addressed in more detail below.  It is impor-
tant to note from the outset, however, that this proposed framework is
intended only as a guide and should not be applied rigidly.  The courts
should take a flexible approach to applying this model to the facts of a partic-
ular case and modify the test as appropriate.
A. Alleging the Fact of Employment Discrimination
The first element of the proposed framework is perhaps the most
straightforward and easiest to apply.  In any Title VII complaint alleging dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion, the
plaintiff should assert that (1) discrimination remains pervasive in our soci-
ety; and (2) discrimination on the basis of the protected class at issue in the
case further remains a problem in the workplace.
For example, an employee who believes that she has been treated
unfairly because she is black should specify that such wrongful conduct on
the basis of race remains an ongoing problem in the employment setting.
Every day in workplaces across the country, workers are discriminated against
because they are black.  This factual statement should be clearly articulated
in the complaint and asserted in a way that most precisely identifies the pro-
tected category at issue in the case.
B. Specifying the Adverse Action at Issue
The second element of the proposed framework is also straightforward.
The complaint should further allege the specific adverse action at issue.  For
example, was the plaintiff fired, demoted, discharged, or otherwise disci-
plined as a result of her protected characteristic?  Under the basic framework
created by the Supreme Court for Title VII claims, plaintiffs must establish
that something sufficiently adverse happened to them to obtain protection
under the statute.259  While the lower courts largely disagree as to how
adverse the conduct must be for coverage,260 the plaintiff should clearly
allege in the complaint that some adverse action has occurred.  It may also be
that there are multiple adverse actions, which occurred in the same case or
on the basis of the same set of facts.
Given the large number of studies in this area, it is often possible to
support an allegation of discrimination on the basis of a particular adverse
action with this scientific research.  Thus, for example, as discussed earlier,
259 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring a com-
plainant in a Title VII trial to demonstrate “that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected”).
260 See generally Peter Siegelman, The Compromised Worker and the Limits of Employ-
ment Discrimination Law 34 (Aug. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2485927 (discussing adverse treatment of
employees).
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there are studies showing the often-blatant racial discrimination, which
occurs on the basis of hiring in our society.261  A plaintiff may, therefore,
properly allege not only that race discrimination is a fact in the workplace,
but that hiring discrimination on the basis of race is a fact as well.
C. Attachments to the Complaint
As specified in Part IV,262 many federal courts routinely consider attach-
ments that are made to a civil complaint.  More precisely, the courts often
take notice of attachments in workplace discrimination cases.  To comply
with this element of the proposed framework, then, plaintiffs should identify
the social science evidence, EEOC data, and litigation statistics that most
closely align with the allegations at issue, and that most clearly support the
fact of workplace discrimination.
This is likely the most difficult element of the proposed framework to
satisfy.  Recent governmental charge data is inexpensive to gather and easy to
identify.263  Litigation statistics and social science data, however, may be
more difficult to uncover.  This is particularly true as plaintiffs should
attempt to attach the studies and data that are most closely aligned to the
protected class, geographical area, and adverse action in question.  While this
information undoubtedly exists, it can be more difficult to identify.
This Article attempts to uncover some of the more well-known and star-
tling studies of discrimination on the basis of each protected category.  It
further brings together some of the more recent charge statistics and litiga-
tion data available.  While this information is convincing on the fact of dis-
crimination in our society generally, plaintiffs should make every effort to
uncover data and statistics that are more precise to the case at hand.  In this
way, public interest groups, plaintiff-side firms, and civil rights groups should
work together to build a database with this information to make it more eas-
ily accessible.  Such groups commonly work together on many issues and
developing a means of identifying this critical information could build on
these existing relationships.  The first three elements of the proposed frame-
work are thus relatively straightforward.  In asserting a Title VII claim, a
plaintiff should allege in the complaint the fact that discrimination persists
with respect to the precise adverse action and protected category at issue.  To
support this fact, the plaintiff should attach the most recent studies, statistical
evidence, and charge data available.
Before turning to the last element of this framework—the defendant’s
possible defense—it can be instructive to illustrate this test through a more
concrete example.  One of the more common areas of discrimination that
currently exists is religious bias.  Let us assume, for example, that a Muslim
261 See supra Part III (addressing social science evidence on racial discrimination).
262 See supra Part IV (discussing how information on discrimination can be attached to
complaint).
263 See generally U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, www.eeoc.gov (last visited Aug.
18, 2017) (providing charge information).
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individual in the New England, Massachusetts area applies for a job at a For-
tune 500 company for which he is well qualified.  Let us assume further that
the applicant is rejected for the position and believes that religious discrimi-
nation is the reason.  In the individual’s civil complaint, the plaintiff should
allege any facts that support the claim, as well as any facts that allow the court
to flesh out the prima facie case of discrimination.  With respect to the frame-
work discussed in this Article, the plaintiff should further allege that:
Discrimination on the basis of religion is a fact in both this country generally
and in the New England, Massachusetts area more specifically.  Discrimina-
tion on the basis of hiring and religion is an unfortunate, and regular occur-
rence, as supported by the existing social science research, governmental
charge data, and litigation in this area.  [See attachment to the complaint.]
In the attachment to the complaint, the plaintiff would include the
numerous studies already discussed in this Article on religious discrimina-
tion.264  More precisely, the plaintiff could attach the study identified in this
Article that addresses discrimination on the basis of hiring and religious affil-
iation in the New England area.265  The plaintiff could further attach the
charge data with respect to religion claims, showing the dramatic increase in
EEOC charges, and noting that the Commission received close to 10,000
claims last year alone.266  Finally, the plaintiff could include any recent cases
that are directly on point, such as those million-dollar discrimination awards
discussed in Section III.B.267
Again, the framework proposed here is intended to be relatively easy to
follow as well as straightforward to apply.  Litigants can comply with these
requirements through the addition of a couple of short sentences in the com-
plaint.  The more difficult inquiry for plaintiffs will be to determine what
should properly be attached to the allegations.  Though there will always be
numerous litigation data, EEOC information, and scientific research to sup-
port just about any discrimination claim, the goal for the litigant should be to
tailor the attachments as closely as possible to the particular case at hand.
This would include information derived from similar adverse actions and
geographical areas, as well as any other similarities that can be achieved to
help support the fact of workplace discrimination.
When properly alleged as a fact, workplace discrimination must be taken
as true under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Factual allegations in the
complaint should thus be considered as truthful assertions and treated
appropriately.  When properly alleging discrimination as a fact—and by sup-
porting that fact through attachments to the complaint—a court should be
bound to treat discrimination as wrongful conduct that regularly occurs in
our society.
264 See supra Part III.
265 See Wright et al., supra note 216.
266 See supra Section III.B.
267 See supra Section III.B.
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D. Defendant’s Opportunity to Respond
The framework proposed here would not be complete without providing
an opportunity for defendants to respond to the allegations.  This will typi-
cally occur in either an answer or a motion to dismiss brought by the defen-
dant.  Almost all claims of discrimination will be plausible on their face, but
there will also be numerous instances where the allegations should not be
allowed to proceed.  For example, the claim may not assert a basic Title VII
case, there may be obvious reasons on the face of the complaint as to why the
allegation should not be permitted, or there may simply be frivolous allega-
tions involved by a plaintiff submitting repeated unsupported claims.
Similarly, the plaintiff may not have properly satisfied the administrative
requirements or the court may lack proper jurisdiction to hear the dispute.
Defendants should, therefore, have the opportunity to make clear to the
court why the plaintiff’s claims are not plausible on their face, and why this is
the more unusual instance where discovery should not be permitted.  Defend-
ants successfully demonstrated pre-Twombly why many claims should be dis-
missed, and defendants should similarly be afforded this opportunity now as
well.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED APPROACH
The framework proposed here has a number of implications associated
with it.  As already noted, the framework is straightforward and requires only
that plaintiffs allege the fact of discrimination, the adverse action at issue,
and include any relevant attachments to the complaint.  The defendant
should then be given an opportunity to show why this is the unusual case
where the fact of workplace discrimination should be disregarded.
One of the primary benefits of this approach would be to allow plaintiffs
to bolster their claims of workplace discrimination.  Given the Supreme
Court’s stated prohibition in Iqbal against conclusory statements in the com-
plaint,268 asserting and supporting the fact of workplace discrimination, as
well as the adverse action at issue, would help to push a plaintiff’s claims from
conceivable to plausible.269  Most Title VII claimants, then, through proper
research and support in the complaint, would be able to properly allege
more than “naked assertions” or simply the “bare elements” of a claim.270
Very few, if any, allegations of employment discrimination would be consid-
ered as “extravagantly fanciful.”271
268 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
269 See generally id. at 684; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
270 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked asser-
tion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)); id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And Rule 8 does not
empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action . . . .” (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 8)).
271 See id. at 681.
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In this way, then, the vast majority of workplace claims would properly
survive a dismissal motion.  As noted earlier, this would simply mark a return
to the pre-Twombly treatment of cases in this area.  As shown by the scientific
research cited throughout this Article, the governmental statistics, and the
numerous high-judgment verdicts and settlements in discrimination cases,
there can be little doubt that discrimination is more than a vestige of the
past.  Discrimination in the workplace continues to occur and is a fact.  Given
this reality, a plaintiff who alleges that she has been individually discrimi-
nated against in the workplace should be given the benefit of a “reasonable
inference” that she has suffered improper treatment.272
The vast majority of discrimination claims, then, should satisfy the plau-
sibility standard articulated by the Supreme Court.  Given how often and
widespread workplace discrimination currently is, any individual claim
should be considered plausible in the absence of the defendant’s proper
demonstration to the contrary.  Any particular workplace claim, through
proper support, should be considered as more than simply conceivable.
This Article does not argue that discrimination actually occurs in every
case.  Indeed, even the EEOC only finds cause to believe that discrimination
occurs in a small percentage of the charges it receives.273  However, the
Supreme Court’s plausibility standard does not require uncontroverted proof
that discrimination actually occurred—such a requirement would fly in the
face of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide only for notice
pleading.  The plausibility requirement is exactly that—a requirement that a
claim has plausibly occurred.  Given the thousands of instances of workplace
discrimination that occur each year, and the supporting data and informa-
tion, any individual claim of discrimination should be treated as plausible on
its face unless the employer demonstrates otherwise.
For the most part, then, Twombly and Iqbal are largely irrelevant when
applied to Title VII cases.  Because discrimination is so prevalent in our soci-
ety, any particular instance and allegation of discrimination should be seen
as plausible.274  In practical terms, this means that the standard articulated in
Twombly (and refined by Iqbal) is largely irrelevant for Title VII cases.  Given
the context of a national workplace that continues to foster discriminatory
attitudes and conduct, any individual’s allegations of discrimination would be
inherently reasonable. Twombly and Iqbal, then, really only impact employ-
ment discrimination claims at the margins.
272 Id. at 678 (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556)).
273 See supra note 162.
274 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1674 (“As applied to the plausible pleading con-
text, the question is not whether, at some stage in the process, a court may look to its own
sources, including the judge’s own life experiences to find legislative facts; rather, it is
whether at the pleading stage a plaintiff may require the court to accept as true the plain-
tiff’s allegations in this regard. . . . Pleading along the[se] lines . . . makes any discrimina-
tion claim more plausible, perhaps plausible enough to move to the discovery stage.”).
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This is not to say that the Supreme Court decisions are inapplicable to
workplace claims.  These decisions are binding in all civil cases, as Iqbal
makes clear.275  Rather, given that these decisions require plaintiffs to plausi-
bly show that discrimination has occurred, the vast majority of plaintiffs will
have already crossed this threshold by simply alleging discriminatory conduct
in the workplace.  And again, as discussed earlier, this means that cases aris-
ing in the employment context should be viewed through a pre-Twombly lens.
Perhaps the best demonstration of the pre-Twombly standard was articu-
lated by Judge Frank Easterbrook in Bennett v. Schmidt,276 where the judge
famously stated that “I was turned down for a job because of my race” was a
sufficient factual statement to survive dismissal in an employment discrimina-
tion case.277  This “Easterbrook standard” was the approach largely followed
by the lower courts prior to the plausibility standard, and in light of the scien-
tific research on the existence of discrimination in the workplace; there is
little reason to deviate from the Easterbrook standard now.  A complaint that
alleges the basic facts of discrimination (such as that under the Easterbrook
standard), combined with relevant social science studies on the topic, EEOC
data, and litigation statistics, should be sufficient to allow the case to go to
discovery and survive dismissal.
It should be emphasized that the Easterbrook standard is not one that
supports a case necessarily going to trial.  Indeed, cases are routinely thrown
out after discovery has taken place and following a motion for summary judg-
ment.  Many cases are dropped before this point in the proceedings, and
many other cases settle.  Only a very small fraction of employment discrimi-
nation claims actually find their way to a jury.278  Given the overwhelming
weight of the evidence on the existence of discrimination in the workplace
generally, as well as the inherent difficulty plaintiffs face when trying to
uncover evidence of wrongful intent, most claims should be permitted to
proceed past the nascent stages of the litigation and into discovery.  It is sim-
ply unfair to restrict plaintiffs from access to the basic information in the
case, particularly where most claims are plausible on their face.
An additional benefit of the approach advocated for here is that it will
help educate the judiciary on this topic.  By attaching the relevant social sci-
ence data, EEOC information, and litigation statistics to the complaint,
judges will have the opportunity to take notice of the discrimination which is
still occurring in specific geographic areas across the country, on every pro-
tected basis.  Members of the judiciary are not typically experts on Title VII,
and often likely do not follow the scientific research involving ongoing dis-
crimination in the workplace.  The framework proposed here, which suggests
that plaintiffs attach such information to the complaint, will allow many in
275 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
276 153 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998).
277 Id. at 518; see also Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (quoting and applying Judge Easterbrook’s standard).
278 See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimi-
nation Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735 (2008).
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the judiciary to see for the first time how discriminatory attitudes in the work-
place continue to persist.  And, as these pleadings and documents are pub-
licly filed, it will also allow the public at large to be educated on these
important issues.
A final benefit of this approach is that it will return the caselaw to the
pre-Twombly standard, thus allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to access criti-
cal information on the question of intent.  As discussed earlier, the difficulty
of establishing discriminatory intent when much of the supporting documen-
tation remains in the employer’s control can often be an insurmountable
hurdle.279  As most cases will proceed to discovery under this approach, then,
it will help allow plaintiffs access to those documents and statements that will
reveal the employer’s true motivations for taking the adverse action.  The
model proposed here thus allows the courts to get at the truth of what actu-
ally occurred.
Perhaps the biggest drawback of the proposed framework advocated for
here is the possibility that the “floodgates of litigation” will be opened and
numerous claims with no basis will be permitted to proceed in federal court.
While a fair concern, this potential drawback is specifically addressed by the
model proposed in this Article.  As explained earlier, there will be a number
of Title VII cases that are not plausible for one reason or another.  The pro-
posed framework does provide a mechanism for addressing such claims.
Cases that on their face make no sense, fail to plead the basic cause of action,
or demonstrate repeated frivolous litigation are but a few examples of
instances where claims should not be permitted to proceed.280  Any reasona-
ble framework, then, should take into account the possibility that discovery
may not be appropriate in a particular instance.  A defendant must have the
opportunity in a motion to dismiss to explain why this is the unusual case
where discrimination is not—at a minimum—plausible on its face in a Title
VII claim.  Under the model proposed here, such claims with no sufficient
factual support should be thrown out.  These types of claims would not have
advanced into discovery pre-Twombly, and they should not be allowed to pro-
ceed now either.
Though discussed in prior Parts, it is also worth noting here that another
possible drawback of the proposed approach is simply its practicality.  Courts
have taken varying approaches to allowing attachments to a complaint, and
many courts might be reluctant to consider social science research when
279 See supra Part II (discussing intent in Title VII cases).
280 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1674–75 (“There are, of course, potential objections
to this view.  Presumably, it would allow any plaintiff to claim any kind of legislative fact to
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.  This, however, is true in the plausible pleading
regime. . . . Similarly, a plaintiff might allege a legislative fact that the court might have to
accept as true, but which would result in Rule 11 sanctions if the fact were not reasonably
based.  In the discrimination context, however, there could be no doubt about the reasona-
bleness, indeed the truth, of the allegation that social science research finds discriminatory
attitudes and, indeed, discriminatory actions very common.”  (footnotes omitted)).
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determining whether a workplace claim is plausible.281  In my view of the
Federal Rules, this type of evidence should be permitted as it goes to the
heart of the question of plausibility.  It thus may take time for all courts to
fully accept and adopt this approach, but for education purposes alone these
types of attachments are both relevant and central to workplace claims.282
At the end of the day, the approach suggested here stresses the irrele-
vancy of the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard for Title VII claims.  A
return to the pre-Twombly standard simply makes sense given the difficulty of
accessing the relevant information in these cases and the overwhelming evi-
dence that discrimination continues to persist.  Ultimately, the Supreme
Court will have to address the appropriate standard in employment discrimi-
nation cases.  In the meantime, the pre-Twombly Easterbrook-type approach
makes the most sense, and the framework proposed here will allow the courts
to properly evaluate Title VII claims under this standard.
It is also important to place the framework proposed here in the context
of the broader academic scholarship.  Many scholars have already discussed
the enormous challenges that face workplace litigants in the wake of the
plausibility standard.  For example, Angela Herring has properly highlighted
the lack of access most workplace plaintiffs have to critical information early
in the case necessary to establish discriminatory intent.283  And Professor
Benjamin Spencer has further argued that “to the extent Twombly permits
courts to dismiss claims for failing to be supported by factual allegations that
the plaintiff is not in a position to know, that seems unfair.”284
Some scholars have already addressed the importance of social science
data in the discrimination context.  For example, Professor Charles Sullivan
discussed the possible relevance of this data with respect to the plausibility
pleading requirement in workplace discrimination cases.285  Sullivan identi-
fied different possible approaches workplace plaintiffs can use to comply with
the plausibility requirement.286  As part of this analysis, Sullivan specifically
raised the idea of referencing social science research and attaching expert
reports.287  He argued that a plaintiff could “simply plead[ ] this social sci-
281 See supra Part IV (discussing differing approaches of courts with respect to attaching
documents to a complaint).
282 See supra Part IV (addressing standard for attaching documents to complaint).
283 Angela K. Herring, Note, Untangling the Twombly-McDonnell Knot: The Substantive
Impact of Procedural Rules in Title VII Cases, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2011).
284 A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW. L.J.
99, 160 (2008).  And, Professor Suja Thomas noted that “[d]iscovery may be very impor-
tant to plaintiffs who may not know the exact parameters of the discrimination that
occurred; for example, wages are not publicized in most workplaces.”  Thomas, supra note
73, at 221.
285 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1662–63.  Professor Stephanie Bornstein has also pub-
lished very persuasive work on the importance of social science research in the context of
the workplace. See generally Bornstein, supra note 20.
286 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1640.
287 Id. at 1662–64.
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ence as a fact, thereby requiring the court to take that fact as true.”288  Sulli-
van further proposed that a plaintiff may plead “legislative facts” through
expert reports that could satisfy the plausibility standard.289  In his article,
Sullivan maintained that whether a workplace claim satisfies the plausibility
standard can turn on a judge’s general views on the existence of discrimina-
tion in employment.290  He did note concerns with this approach, however,
as the true issue for resolution “is not whether it is plausible to believe there
is discrimination in American society but rather whether it is plausible to
believe this defendant discriminated against this plaintiff.”291
This Article builds off of this earlier work of Sullivan, demonstrating the
need to plead this type of social science research to establish discrimination.
The Article takes the next step of showing how the courts have rejected oth-
erwise viable employment discrimination claims on the basis of the plausibil-
ity standard.  This Article also gathers and synthesizes the important
research, EEOC data, and litigation statistics in this area.  And it proposes a
new framework that will allow both litigants and the courts to evaluate
whether specific claims of discrimination should be allowed to proceed.
Given the widespread nature of discrimination in almost every geographic
area and on the basis of every protected class, pleading this type of informa-
tion should be sufficient to at least give rise to a plausible claim.
Similarly, Professor Michael Zimmer addressed plausibility and back-
ground assumptions with respect to discrimination claims.292  Zimmer dis-
cussed how social science (and statistical evidence) can be used to change
the existing assumptions of the judiciary.293  Zimmer reasoned that, “the
existence of implicit bias is one important way to understand the persistence
of discrimination” and “[t]hat demonstration should be useful in pleading
cases to satisfy the Iqbal plausibility standard in response to motions to dis-
miss antidiscrimination complaints.”294
288 Id. at 1663.
Legislative fact-finding is reached by a kind of judicial notice, but not the
very constrained variety applicable to notice of adjudicative facts.  The Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly acknowledged a wide
range of judicial power in this regard: the court should be able to “find” legisla-
tive facts in the same way it finds domestic law, which basically includes all written
or published sources, whether or not referenced by the parties.  Indeed, because
judges can look to their own life experiences, they are not limited to written mate-
rial. . . . [and] parties may attempt to influence such findings by evidence and
citations.
Id. at 1673 (footnotes omitted).
289 See id. at 1673–75.
290 Id. at 1674.
291 Id. at 1675 (emphasis omitted).
292 Michael J. Zimmer, Title VII’s Last Hurrah: Can Discrimination Be Plausibly Pled?, 2014
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 80–91.
293 Id. at 80, 89.
294 Id. at 88.  “The research showing the persistence of discrimination and how implicit
bias is a cause of that persistence would be used to inform the ‘judicial experience and
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Similar to Sullivan and Zimmer, and as discussed in greater detail above,
this Article argues social science research (and other evidence of discrimina-
tion) can provide a critical educational function for the public and the judici-
ary.295  Most federal judges have not specialized in this very unique and
individualized area of the law and they may simply be unaware of the over-
whelming amount of research that exists.  By including this information in
the complaint, it can help to educate the judiciary and even change percep-
tions as to the ongoing nature of much workplace discrimination.  By making
the judiciary aware of this research, then, it can change perceptions as well as
a court’s view on the likelihood that a particular discrimination claim will
succeed.  When a court becomes aware of the bias that continues to persist in
today’s workplace, any individual claim of employment discrimination inher-
ently seems much more plausible.296
This Article thus builds off of the foundation created by much of the
superb data and scholarship already existing in this field, suggesting a new
way of analyzing “plausibility” for employment discrimination claims.  There
can be little doubt—after reviewing the relevant data and research—that dis-
crimination is a fact.  Facts can—and should—be properly pled in a com-
plaint.  This Article offers one workable approach to bringing these types of
workplace allegations.
CONCLUSION
When considering the social science evidence presented in this Article,
there can be little doubt that employment discrimination is a fact in our soci-
ety.  This fact is further supported by the EEOC data addressed in this Arti-
cle, and by specific examples of successful Title VII litigation.  As a fact,
workplace discrimination can properly be alleged in a Title VII complaint.
Through the framework proposed here, most employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs should survive a motion to dismiss.  The lower courts have
common sense’ of the judge in determining whether the facts set forth in the complaint
plausibly plead discrimination.”  Id. at 89.
295 Sullivan specifically discussed the educational role of this research, stating that
[l]egislative facts are found by the courts in lawmaking by drawing on, for lack of
a better word, common-sense notions of how the world works . . . [essentially]
baseline assumptions.  The parallel between legislative facts and Iqbal’s view that
evaluating pleadings is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense” is obvious.  And a mechanism
that allows parties to educate judges would seem to blunt at least some of the
criticisms of Twombly/Iqbal.
Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1672–73 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 679 (2009)).
296 Others have also addressed the importance of social science research in the judicial
context. See generally Gregory Mitchell et al., Beyond Context: Social Facts as Case-Specific Evi-
dence, 60 EMORY L.J. 1109 (2011); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988); Alicia Luke, Note, Employment
Discrimination Litigation: Social Science Evidence and a Solution for the Problem of Presumptions, 29
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 75 (2010).
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applied Twombly and Iqbal far too rigidly, leading to a heightened pleading
standard for workplace claims.  Given the evidence showing the prevalent
nature of workplace discrimination in our society, most individual allegations
of employer misconduct are plausible on their face.  The model offered in
this Article thus demonstrates how these Supreme Court decisions are largely
irrelevant for Title VII cases, and clearly establishes that most employment
discrimination plaintiffs should be permitted access to discovery in these
matters.
The fact of workplace discrimination can simply no longer be ignored,
and such discrimination should now be presumed in most cases.
